CVE-2026-71866 — Vulnerability in orval — CVE Details

### Summary orval's zod client emits each schema property name as a double-quoted key in the generated zod.object({...}) WITHOUT escaping the double quote. A " in a property name closes the key and lands in object-literal context, where an injected computed property key [expr] is evaluated when zod.object({...}) runs -- which is at MODULE IMPORT (the `export const X = zod.object({...})` executes on load) -> import-time RCE. The property name is a pure data field. Verified on orval 8.19.0 / Node. CWE-94 / CWE-95 / CWE-116. ### Details ```ts export const OpBody = zod.object({ "a":zod.string(),[require("fs").writeFileSync("PWNED","")]:zod.string(),"b": zod.string().optional() }) ``` Sibling: the MSW mock uses a single-quoted key (' breakout, call-time) -- separate report. The TS interface key is a type (DoS only). Distinct from orval's $ref / route-path / server-url / zod-default findings. ### PoC reproduce.sh (+ make_spec.py) attached: a property name a":zod.string(),[require("fs").writeFileSync("<marker>","")]:zod.string(),"b -> zod.object; evaluating it (= importing the module) writes the marker. Verified on 8.19.0. ### Impact JavaScript / OS command execution (via child_process) at import time for anyone who generates an orval zod client from an attacker-controlled spec and imports it. Estimated Critical, e.g. `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`. ### Suggested fix Escape the property name for the JS string key (JSON.stringify) in the zod.object key generation; never interpolate a raw property name adjacent to [ ] in object-literal position. [maintainer-report.txt](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29426038/maintainer-report.txt) [make_spec.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29426039/make_spec.py) [reproduce.sh](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29426040/reproduce.sh)