CVE-2026-71864 — Vulnerability in orval — CVE Details

### Summary orval's zod client emits each header parameter name as a double-quoted key in the generated zod.object({...}) request-validation schema WITHOUT escaping the double quote. A " in the header parameter name closes the key and lands in object-literal context, where an injected computed property key [expr] is evaluated when zod.object({...}) runs -- at MODULE IMPORT (export const OpHeader = zod.object({...}) executes on load) -> import-time RCE. The header parameter name is a pure data field. Verified on orval 8.19.0 / Node. ### Details export const OpHeader = zod.object({ "a":zod.string(),[require("fs").writeFileSync("PWNED","")]:zod.string(),"b": ... }) Also affects the hono client (reuses zod generation). orval escapes values in zod arrays but not keys in zod.object. Sibling fields: schema property name, query parameter name (CVE-96) (separate reports). Distinct from orval's $ref / route-path / server-url / zod-default findings. ### PoC reproduce.sh (+ make_spec.py) attached: a header parameter name that breaks the zod.object key and injects a computed key; evaluating it (= importing the module) writes the marker. Verified on 8.19.0. ### Impact JavaScript / OS command execution at import time for anyone who generates an orval zod client from an attacker-controlled spec and imports it. ### Suggested fix Escape the header parameter name for the JS string key (JSON.stringify) in the zod.object key generation; never interpolate a raw name adjacent to [ ] in object-literal position.