CVE-2026-57116

# AgentOS remains unauthenticated after GHSA-pm96 patched version and allows remote agent invocation ## Summary PraisonAI's `AgentOS` FastAPI deployment surface remains unauthenticated in current main and in releases after the published patched version for `GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x` / `CVE-2026-40151`. The public AgentOS advisory is published as an instruction-disclosure issue with affected versions `< 4.5.128` and patched version `4.5.128`. However, `v4.5.128`, latest release `v4.6.57`, and current main still register `GET /api/agents` and `POST /api/chat` without authentication. The chat route directly calls `agent.chat(request.message)`. No-auth and wrong-bearer requests both execute the deployed agent. This is broader than passive metadata disclosure. In any deployment where AgentOS wraps agents with tools, private context, memory, API integrations, or cost-bearing model calls, an unauthenticated reachable client can drive those agents. ## Affected Product - Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI` - Package: `praisonai` - Component: `src/praisonai/praisonai/app/agentos.py` - Config component: `src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/app/config.py` - Public advisory incomplete-fix reference: `GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x` / `CVE-2026-40151` Confirmed affected dynamically: - `v4.5.126` - `v4.5.128` (published patched version for `GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x`) - `v4.6.9` - `v4.6.10` - `v4.6.56` - `v4.6.57` - current main `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1` Static source review found the same unauthenticated route pattern and `0.0.0.0` default in `v4.2.1`. Suggested affected range: `>= 4.2.1, <= 4.6.57`. ## Root Cause `AgentOSConfig` / `AgentAppConfig` defaults the deployment host to all interfaces and has no authentication fields: ```python name: str = "PraisonAI App" host: str = "0.0.0.0" port: int = 8000 api_prefix: str = "/api" ``` `AgentOS._register_routes()` registers public agent metadata and chat routes without middleware, dependency, API key check, bearer-token check, or startup fail-closed guard: ```python @app.get(f"{self.config.api_prefix}/agents") async def list_agents(): return {"agents": [...]} @app.post(f"{self.config.api_prefix}/chat", response_model=ChatResponse) async def chat(request: ChatRequest): ... response = agent.chat(request.message) ``` A wrong `Authorization` header is ignored because the route does not inspect it. Current main also has a root-export bug where `from praisonai import AgentOS` raises `ImportError`, but this does not mitigate the issue. The same class remains reachable through `from praisonai import AgentApp` and `from praisonai.app import AgentOS`. ## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior PraisonAI's security documentation says API servers were hardened so anonymous requests return `401` and default binding changed from `0.0.0.0` to `127.0.0.1` after the prior unauthenticated API server class. The API Server Authentication docs say bearer auth is enabled by default, disabling auth is not recommended for production, and `0.0.0.0` should be used only behind an authenticating proxy. The local PoV includes a hardened sibling control for the generated deploy API on current main. It returns: - no auth: `401` - wrong bearer: `401` - correct bearer: `200` AgentOS remains outside that control plane and still accepts no-auth and wrong-bearer `/api/chat` requests. ## Local PoV The PoV is local-only. It uses FastAPI's in-process test client, a stub agent, and a temporary file side effect. It does not start a network listener, call an LLM provider, or contact any external service. Command: ```bash env PYTHONPATH="artifacts/repos/praisonai-current/src/praisonai:artifacts/repos/praisonai-current/src/praisonai-agents" \ uv run --with fastapi --with httpx --with flask --with flask-cors \ --with pydantic --with typing-extensions --with rich --with python-dotenv \ submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-007-agentos-incomplete-auth-fix/poc/prai_cand_007_agentos_incomplete_auth_fix.py \ --repo artifacts/repos/praisonai-current \ --label current-head ``` Current-head result summary: ```json { "describe": "v4.6.57-4-g2f9677ab", "head": "2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1", "agentos_vulnerable": true, "entrypoints": [ { "entrypoint": "agentapp_alias", "statuses": [200, 200, 200], "side_effects": ["no-auth-marker", "wrong-bearer-marker"] }, { "entrypoint": "direct_agentos", "statuses": [200, 200, 200], "side_effects": ["no-auth-marker", "wrong-bearer-marker"] } ], "deploy_api_control": { "control_passed": true, "statuses": [401, 401, 200] } } ``` The three AgentOS statuses are for: - unauthenticated `GET /api/agents`; - unauthenticated `POST /api/chat`; - wrong-bearer `POST /api/chat`. The side-effect list proves both unauthenticated chat requests invoked the agent method. Minimal inline reproducer: ```python from pathlib import Path from tempfile import TemporaryDirectory from fastapi.testclient import TestClient from praisonai import AgentApp from praisonaiagents import AgentOSConfig class StubAgent: name = "pov_agentos_agent" role = "tester" instructions = "private instruction marker" def __init__(self, out): self.out = out def chat(self, message): self.out.write_text(self.out.read_text() + message + "\n") return "PRAI_CAND_007_AGENTOS_EXECUTED:" + message with TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: side_effect = Path(tmp) / "side_effects.txt" side_effect.write_text("") app = AgentApp( agents=[StubAgent(side_effect)], config=AgentOSConfig(host="0.0.0.0", port=8000), ) client = TestClient(app.get_app()) assert client.get("/api/agents").status_code == 200 assert client.post("/api/chat", json={"message": "no-auth"}).status_code == 200 assert client.post( "/api/chat", headers={"Authorization": "Bearer definitely-wrong"}, json={"message": "wrong-bearer"}, ).status_code == 200 assert side_effect.read_text().splitlines() == ["no-auth", "wrong-bearer"] ``` ## Version Sweep | Target | Result | | --- | --- | | `v4.5.126` | vulnerable | | `v4.5.128` | vulnerable | | `v4.6.9` | vulnerable | | `v4.6.10` | vulnerable | | `v4.6.56` | vulnerable; generated deploy API control returns `401/401/200` | | `v4.6.57` | vulnerable; generated deploy API control returns `401/401/200` | | current `2f9677abb` | vulnerable; generated deploy API control returns `401/401/200` | Evidence files are retained locally under the bundle's `evidence/` directory and can be provided if useful. ## Duplicate / Incomplete-Fix Notes This report is related to `GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x` / `CVE-2026-40151`. The published advisory describes AgentOS instruction disclosure and lists `4.5.128` as patched. It also mentions unauthenticated `/api/chat` as a chained instruction-extraction path. The current report should be treated as an incomplete fix / affected-range correction with a broader demonstrated impact: - the published patched version `v4.5.128` still reproduces; - latest release `v4.6.57` still reproduces; - current main still reproduces; - the PoV proves unauthorized agent invocation and side effects, not only instruction disclosure. This is distinct from private `PRAI-CAND-003` / `GHSA-x8cv-xmq7-p8xp`, which covers `praisonaiagents.AgentTeam.launch()` routes. This report covers `praisonai.app.AgentOS` and `AgentApp` alias routes. ## Impact If an operator exposes an AgentOS app on a reachable interface, any client that can reach it can: - enumerate deployed agents through `GET /api/agents`; - read agent names, roles, and instruction snippets; - invoke the default agent or a named agent through `POST /api/chat`; - trigger downstream tools, private context reads, memory accesses, API integrations, browser actions, or other side effects attached to the agent; - consume model/API budget through repeated invocation. The exact downstream impact depends on the deployed agents. The framework-level boundary failure is that a production deployment surface exposes agent control without authentication and defaults to binding on all interfaces. ## Suggested Fix Use the same security model already applied to generated API deployments: - add authentication fields to `AgentOSConfig` / `AgentAppConfig`; - default auth to enabled; - default bind host to `127.0.0.1`; - reject no-auth and wrong-bearer requests for `GET /api/agents` and `POST /api/chat`; - fail closed for non-loopback binds unless auth is configured or an explicit unsafe development opt-out is set; - avoid returning instruction text from unauthenticated metadata endpoints; - add regression tests for no auth, wrong bearer, correct bearer, and external bind without auth. Maintainers can either update `GHSA-pm96-6xpr-978x` with the corrected affected range and broader impact or publish a separate incomplete-fix advisory. ## Suggested Severity Suggested severity: Critical. The Critical score matches the unauthenticated agent-control model: network attacker, low complexity, no privileges, no user interaction, and high deployment-dependent impact when agents are connected to tools, private data, or cost-bearing services. If maintainers score only a minimal no-tool demo agent, the impact may be lower, but the current default framework behavior is still unauthenticated agent invocation.