CVE-2026-81891 — Vulnerability in Studio-42/elFinder — CVE Details

### Summary elFinder provides `uploadDeny` and `uploadAllow` options in its connector configuration to restrict which MIME types may be uploaded. When `uploadDeny` includes `text/x-php`, direct upload of `.php`, `.phtml`, and `.phar` files is correctly blocked. However, the `extract` command (ZIP decompression) internally calls `checkExtractItems()`, which invokes `mimetypeInternalDetect()` directly without passing the result through `mimeTypeNormalize()`. Because `phtml`, `phar`, and similar PHP-executable extensions are absent from `mime.types`, they are not resolved to `text/x-php` at the detection stage, causing the MIME filter to be silently bypassed. An attacker who is permitted to upload ZIP archives can therefore extract PHP-executable files into the web-accessible `files/` directory. If the server is configured to execute the affected extension (e.g., `.phtml`, `.phar`) as PHP — which is the case in common Apache and Nginx deployments — this results in Remote Code Execution. --- ### Details elFinder's MIME validation pipeline for **direct uploads** (`upload` command) is: ``` mimetype() └─ mimetypeInternalDetect() // stage 1: extension → MIME via mime.types └─ mimeTypeNormalize() // stage 2: apply staticMimeMap phtml:* → text/x-php phar:* → text/x-php php5:* → text/x-php └─ allowPutMime() // blocked: text/x-php ∈ uploadDeny ``` The `extract` command (`checkExtractItems()` in `elFinderVolumeDriver.class.php`, line 7110) uses a **shortened** pipeline: ```php // line 7110 — stage 2 (mimeTypeNormalize) is never called if ($chkMime && ($mimeByName = elFinderVolumeDriver::mimetypeInternalDetect($name)) && !$this->allowPutMime($mimeByName)) { ``` Because `phtml` and `phar` are not present in `mime.types`, `mimetypeInternalDetect()` returns a generic type (e.g., `application/octet-stream`) for these extensions. Without `mimeTypeNormalize()`, the `staticMimeMap` entries that would map `phtml:*` → `text/x-php` are never applied, so `allowPutMime()` sees a non-blocked MIME and permits extraction. **Affected extensions confirmed:** `.phtml`, `.phar`, `.php5`, `.php3` **Not bypassed:** `.php` (present in `mime.types`, detected as `text/x-php` in stage 1) --- ### PoC **Requirements:** - elFinder 2.1.69 deployed under Apache/Nginx (PHP-FPM or mod_php) - Connector configured with `uploadDeny = ['text/x-php']` and `uploadAllow` including `application/zip` - `files/` directory served under a public web path **Step 1 — Confirm direct upload is blocked** Open elFinder in a browser and click the **Upload** button. Select `hello.phtml` (content: `<?php phpinfo(); ?>`). → Upload is rejected with: *"Upload file hello.phtml: File type not allowed (text/x-php)"* <img width="1061" height="408" alt="1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/22f833d9-7d2a-4197-85c2-3b0eb19ecfbc" /> **Step 2 — Upload a ZIP containing the payload** Create `bypass.zip` containing `hello.phtml`. Upload `bypass.zip` via the **Upload** button. → ZIP is accepted (MIME: `application/zip` ∈ `uploadAllow`). <img width="886" height="320" alt="2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/30c3498f-91f4-45cf-8c2b-cc806716e3a4" /> **Step 3 — Extract the ZIP** Right-click `bypass.zip` in the file list → **Extract files**. → `hello.phtml` appears in the file list without any error. → File is now present at `{files_dir}/hello.phtml` on the server. <img width="1123" height="792" alt="3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/49e7db8e-566c-4653-a57f-e80fb31ea61d" /> **Step 4 — Execute the extracted PHP file** Navigate to: ``` http://<target>/elFinder/files/hello.phtml ``` → Apache processes the file as PHP and renders the full `phpinfo()` output, confirming Remote Code Execution. --- <img width="1059" height="739" alt="4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ad85fdf7-bdc7-4514-bdec-e45cfb2e2bd3" /> ### Impact Any user with ZIP upload permission can bypass the `uploadDeny` MIME restriction, place PHP-executable files in a web-accessible directory, and achieve Remote Code Execution on the server. **Concrete impact:** - Arbitrary PHP code execution on the web server - Full server environment disclosure via `phpinfo()` (paths, PHP version, loaded modules, environment variables) - Potential access to server filesystem, database credentials, and internal network services - Complete compromise of the web application if an attacker substitutes `phpinfo()` with a web shell (e.g., `<?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?>`) **Extensions confirmed executable on Apache (default config):** phtml, phar, php5, php3 **Recommended fix:** Apply `mimeTypeNormalize()` inside `checkExtractItems()` so that the full MIME pipeline is used consistently: ```php // elFinderVolumeDriver.class.php, line 7110 // Before (vulnerable): $mimeByName = elFinderVolumeDriver::mimetypeInternalDetect($name) // After (fixed): $mimeByName = $this->mimeTypeNormalize( elFinderVolumeDriver::mimetypeInternalDetect($name), $name, pathinfo($name, PATHINFO_EXTENSION) ) ``` --- ---