CVE-2026-74786 — Vulnerability in Scriban — CVE Details

## Summary The `LimitToString` safety limit (default 1MB since commit `b5ac4bf`) can be bypassed to allocate approximately 1GB of memory by exploiting the per-call reset of `_currentToStringLength` in `ObjectToString`. Each template expression rendered through `TemplateContext.Write(SourceSpan, object)` triggers a separate top-level `ObjectToString` call that resets the length counter to zero, and the underlying `StringBuilderOutput` has no cumulative output size limit. An attacker who can supply a template can cause an out-of-memory condition in the host application. ## Details The root cause is in `TemplateContext.Helpers.cs`, in the `ObjectToString` method: ```csharp // src/Scriban/TemplateContext.Helpers.cs:89-111 public virtual string ObjectToString(object value, bool nested = false) { if (_objectToStringLevel == 0) { _currentToStringLength = 0; // <-- resets on every top-level call } try { _objectToStringLevel++; // ... var result = ObjectToStringImpl(value, nested); if (LimitToString > 0 && _objectToStringLevel == 1 && result != null && result.Length >= LimitToString) { return result + "..."; } return result; } // ... } ``` Each time a template expression is rendered, `TemplateContext.Write(SourceSpan, object)` calls `ObjectToString`: ```csharp // src/Scriban/TemplateContext.cs:693-701 public virtual TemplateContext Write(SourceSpan span, object textAsObject) { if (textAsObject != null) { var text = ObjectToString(textAsObject); // fresh _currentToStringLength = 0 Write(text); } return this; } ``` The `StringBuilderOutput.Write` method appends unconditionally with no size check: ```csharp // src/Scriban/Runtime/StringBuilderOutput.cs:47-50 public void Write(string text, int offset, int count) { Builder.Append(text, offset, count); // no cumulative limit } ``` **Execution flow:** 1. Template creates a string of length 1,048,575 (one byte under the 1MB `LimitToString` default) 2. A `for` loop iterates up to `LoopLimit` (default 1000) times 3. Each iteration renders the string via `Write(span, x)` → `ObjectToString(x)` 4. `ObjectToString` resets `_currentToStringLength = 0` since `_objectToStringLevel == 0` 5. The string passes the `LimitToString` check (1,048,575 < 1,048,576) 6. Full string is appended to `StringBuilder` — no cumulative tracking 7. After 1000 iterations: ~1GB allocated in-memory ## PoC ```csharp using Scriban; // Uses only default TemplateContext settings (LoopLimit=1000, LimitToString=1048576) var template = Template.Parse("{{ x = \"\" | string.pad_left 1048575 }}{{ for i in 1..1000 }}{{ x }}{{ end }}"); // This will allocate ~1GB in the StringBuilder, likely causing OOM var result = template.Render(); ``` Equivalent Scriban template: ```scriban {{ x = "" | string.pad_left 1048575 }}{{ for i in 1..1000 }}{{ x }}{{ end }} ``` Each of the 1000 loop iterations outputs a 1,048,575-character string. Each passes the per-call `LimitToString` check independently. Total output: ~1,000,000,000 characters (~1GB) allocated in the `StringBuilder`. ## Impact - **Denial of Service:** An attacker who can supply Scriban templates (common in CMS, email templating, report generation) can crash the host application via out-of-memory - **Process-level impact:** OOM kills the entire .NET process, not just the template rendering — affects all concurrent users - **Bypass of safety mechanism:** The `LimitToString` limit was specifically introduced to prevent resource exhaustion, but the per-call reset makes it ineffective against cumulative abuse - **Low complexity:** The exploit template is trivial — a single line ## Recommended Fix Add a cumulative output size counter to `TemplateContext` that tracks total bytes written across all `Write` calls, independent of the per-object `LimitToString`: ```csharp // In TemplateContext.cs — add new property and field private long _totalOutputLength; /// <summary> /// Gets or sets the maximum total output length in characters. Default is 10485760 (10 MB). 0 means no limit. /// </summary> public int OutputLimit { get; set; } = 10485760; // In TemplateContext.Write(string, int, int) — add check before writing public TemplateContext Write(string text, int startIndex, int count) { if (text != null) { if (OutputLimit > 0) { _totalOutputLength += count; if (_totalOutputLength > OutputLimit) { throw new ScriptRuntimeException(CurrentSpan, $"The output limit of {OutputLimit} characters was reached."); } } // ... existing indent/write logic } return this; } ``` This provides defense-in-depth: `LimitToString` caps individual object serialization, while `OutputLimit` caps total template output.