CVE-2026-65595

## Impact JWTs issued through the Token Exchange module were assigned all Public API key scopes, regardless of the acting user's actual role. A low-privileged user who could obtain a valid external JWT trusted by a configured issuer could therefore use the resulting access token to invoke administrator-only Public API operations, such as role escalation, user creation, and user deletion. The issue only affects instances where the Token Exchange feature and the Public API are enabled (N8N_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_ENABLED=true, N8N_ENV_FEAT_TOKEN_EXCHANGE=true) and the attacker can obtain an external JWT accepted by a configured trusted key. Role escalation additionally requires an Advanced Permissions license; Community Package installation additionally requires `N8N_COMMUNITY_PACKAGES_ENABLED=true` and `N8N_UNVERIFIED_PACKAGES_ENABLED=true`. ## Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n version 2.30.1 and 2.29.8. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Disable the Token Exchange feature by setting `N8N_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_ENABLED=false` or `N8N_ENV_FEAT_TOKEN_EXCHANGE=false`. - If Token Exchange cannot be disabled, restrict Public API access at the network level to trusted clients only. - Disable unverified Community Package installation by setting `N8N_UNVERIFIED_PACKAGES_ENABLED=false` to eliminate the code execution path. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.