CVE-2026-40887 — Vulnerability in @vendure/core — CVE Details

## Summary An unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability exists in the Vendure Shop API. A user-controlled query string parameter is interpolated directly into a raw SQL expression without parameterization or validation, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary SQL against the database. This affects all supported database backends (PostgreSQL, MySQL/MariaDB, SQLite). The Admin API is also affected, though exploitation there requires authentication. ## Affected versions - `@vendure/core` < 2.3.4 - `@vendure/core` >= 3.0.0, < 3.5.7 - `@vendure/core` >= 3.6.0, < 3.6.2 Note: versions 2.3.4 and above in the 2.x line are patched. There were no 2.4.x or 2.x releases between 2.3.x and 3.0.0. ## Patched versions - `@vendure/core` 2.3.4 - `@vendure/core` 3.5.7 - `@vendure/core` 3.6.2 ## Details In `ProductService.findOneBySlug`, the request context's `languageCode` value is interpolated into a SQL `CASE` expression via a JavaScript template literal: ```ts .addSelect( `CASE translation.languageCode WHEN '${ctx.languageCode}' THEN 2 WHEN '${ctx.channel.defaultLanguageCode}' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END`, 'sort_order', ) ``` TypeORM has no opportunity to parameterize this value because it is embedded directly into the SQL string before being passed to the query builder. The `languageCode` value can originate from the HTTP query string and is set on the request context for every incoming API request. The value is cast to the `LanguageCode` TypeScript type at compile time, but no runtime validation is performed -- the raw query string value is used as-is. ## Attack vector An unauthenticated attacker can append a crafted `languageCode` query parameter to any Shop API request to inject arbitrary SQL into the query. No user interaction is required. The vulnerable endpoint is exposed on every default Vendure installation. ## Mitigation **Upgrade to a patched version immediately.** If you cannot upgrade right away, apply the following hotfix to `RequestContextService.getLanguageCode` to validate the `languageCode` input at the boundary. This blocks injection payloads before they can reach any query: ```ts private getLanguageCode(req: Request, channel: Channel): LanguageCode | undefined { const queryLanguageCode = req.query?.languageCode as string | undefined; const isValidFormat = queryLanguageCode && /^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(queryLanguageCode); return ( (isValidFormat ? (queryLanguageCode as LanguageCode) : undefined) ?? channel.defaultLanguageCode ?? this.configService.defaultLanguageCode ); } ``` This replaces the existing `getLanguageCode` method in `packages/core/src/service/helpers/request-context/request-context.service.ts`. Invalid values are silently dropped and the channel's default language is used instead. The patched versions additionally convert the vulnerable SQL interpolation to a parameterized query as defense in depth.