CVE-2026-34785

## Summary `Rack::Static` determines whether a request should be served as a static file using a simple string prefix check. When configured with URL prefixes such as `"/css"`, it matches any request path that begins with that string, including unrelated paths such as `"/css-config.env"` or `"/css-backup.sql"`. As a result, files under the static root whose names merely share the configured prefix may be served unintentionally, leading to information disclosure. ## Details `Rack::Static#route_file` performs static-route matching using logic equivalent to: ```ruby @urls.any? { |url| path.index(url) == 0 } ``` This checks only whether the request path starts with the configured prefix string. It does not require a path segment boundary after the prefix. For example, with: ```ruby use Rack::Static, urls: ["/css", "/js"], root: "public" ``` the following path is matched as intended: ```text /css/style.css ``` but these paths are also matched: ```text /css-config.env /css-backup.sql /csssecrets.yml ``` If such files exist under the configured static root, Rack forwards the request to the file server and serves them as static content. This means a configuration intended to expose only directory trees such as `/css/...` and `/js/...` may also expose sibling files whose names begin with those same strings. ## Impact An attacker can request files under the configured static root whose names share a configured URL prefix and obtain their contents. In affected deployments, this may expose configuration files, secrets, backups, environment files, or other unintended static content located under the same root directory. ## Mitigation * Update to a patched version of Rack that enforces a path boundary when matching configured static URL prefixes. * Match only paths that are either exactly equal to the configured prefix or begin with `prefix + "/"`. * Avoid placing sensitive files under the `Rack::Static` root directory. * Prefer static URL mappings that cannot overlap with sensitive filenames.