CVE-2026-31830 — Vulnerability in sigstore — CVE Details

### Summary `Sigstore::Verifier#verify` does not propagate the `VerificationFailure` returned by `verify_in_toto` when the artifact digest does not match the digest in the in-toto attestation subject. As a result, verification of DSSE bundles containing in-toto statements returns `VerificationSuccess` regardless of whether the artifact matches the attested subject. ### Details In `lib/sigstore/verifier.rb`, the verify method calls `verify_in_toto` (line 176) without capturing or checking its return value: `verify_in_toto(input, in_toto)` When `verify_in_toto` detects a digest mismatch, it returns a `VerificationFailure` object. Because the caller discards this return value, execution unconditionally falls through to return `VerificationSuccess`. This is the only verification sub-check in the method (out of 12) whose failure is not propagated. The message_signature code path is not affected. ### Impact An attacker who possesses a valid signed DSSE bundle containing an in-toto attestation for artifact A can present it as a valid attestation for a different artifact B. All other verification checks (DSSE envelope signature, certificate chain, Rekor inclusion, SCTs, policy) pass because they are independent of the artifact content. Only the in-toto subject digest check detects the mismatch, and its result is discarded. This allows an attacker to bypass artifact-to-attestation binding for any consumer that relies on `Sigstore::Verifier#verify` to validate DSSE/in-toto bundles. ### Workarounds None. Consumers cannot work around this without patching the library.