CVE-2026-30934 — FileBrowser Quantum: Stored XSS in...

## Summary Stored XSS is possible via share metadata fields (e.g., `title`, `description`) that are rendered into HTML for `/public/share/<hash>` without context-aware escaping. The server uses `text/template` instead of `html/template`, allowing injected scripts to execute when victims visit the share URL. ## Details The server renders `public/index.html` using `text/template` and injects user-controlled share fields (title/description/etc.) into HTML contexts. `text/template` does not perform HTML contextual escaping like `html/template`. Because share metadata is persistent, the payload becomes stored and executes whenever a victim opens the affected share page. Relevant code paths: - `backend/http/static.go` (template rendering and share metadata assignment) - `backend/http/httpRouter.go` (template initialization) - `frontend/public/index.html` (insertion points for title/description and related fields) ## PoC 1. Login as a user with share creation permission. 2. Create a share (`POST /api/share`) with malicious metadata: - `title = </title><script>alert("xss")</script><title>` 3. Open the resulting `/public/share/<hash>` URL in a browser. 4. **Expected:** Payload is safely escaped and displayed as text. 5. **Actual:** JavaScript executes in victim's browser (stored XSS). Tested on Docker image: `gtstef/filebrowser:stable` (version `v1.2.1-stable`). ## Impact - Arbitrary script execution in application origin. - Potential account/session compromise, CSRF-like action execution, data exfiltration from authenticated contexts. - Affects anyone (including unauthenticated visitors) opening the malicious share URL. - The XSS is stored and persistent — no social engineering beyond sharing the link is required.