CVE-2026-22257 — Salvo is vulnerable to stored XSS in salvo — CVE...

# Summary The function `list_html` generates a file view of a folder without sanitizing the files or folders names, potentially leading to XSS in cases where a website allows access to public files using this feature, allowing anyone to upload a file. # Details The vulnerable snippet of code is the following: [**dir.rs**](https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/blob/16efeba312a274739606ce76366d921768628654/crates/serve-static/src/dir.rs#L581) ```rust // ... fn list_html(... let mut link = "".to_owned(); format!( r#"<a href="/">{}</a>{}"#, HOME_ICON, segments .map(|seg| { link = format!("{link}/{seg}"); format!("/<a href=\"{link}\">{seg}</a>") }) .collect::<Vec<_>>() .join("") ) // ... ``` # PoC https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1e161e17-f033-4cc4-855b-43fd38ed1be4 Here is the example app we used: `mian.rs` ```rs use salvo::prelude::*; use salvo::serve_static::StaticDir; use std::path::PathBuf; use tokio::fs; const INDEX_HTML: &str = r#"<!doctype html> <html> <head><meta charset="utf-8"><title>StaticDir PoC</title></head> <body> <h2>Upload a file</h2> <form action="/upload" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data"> <input type="file" name="file" /> <button type="submit">Upload</button> </form> <p>Browse uploads:</p> <ul> <li><a href="/files">/files</a></li> <li><a href="/files/">/files/</a></li> </ul> </body> </html> "#; #[handler] async fn index(res: &mut Response) { res.render(Text::Html(INDEX_HTML)); } #[handler] async fn upload(req: &mut Request, res: &mut Response) { fs::create_dir_all("uploads").await.expect("create uploads dir"); let form = match req.form_data().await { Ok(v) => v, Err(e) => { res.status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); res.render(Text::Plain(format!("form_data parse failed: {e}"))); return; } }; let Some(file_part) = form.files.get("file") else { res.status_code(StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST); res.render(Text::Plain("missing file field (name=\"file\")")); return; }; let original_name = file_part.name().unwrap_or("upload.bin"); let mut dest = PathBuf::from("uploads"); dest.push(original_name); let tmp_path = file_part.path(); if let Err(e) = fs::copy(tmp_path, &dest).await { res.status_code(StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR); res.render(Text::Plain(format!("save failed: {e}"))); return; } res.render(Text::Plain(format!( "Uploaded as: {original_name}\nNow open: http://127.0.0.1:5800/files/\n" ))); } #[tokio::main] async fn main() { tracing_subscriber::fmt().init(); fs::create_dir_all("uploads").await.expect("create uploads dir"); let router = Router::new() .get(index) .push(Router::with_path("upload").post(upload)) .push( Router::with_path("files/{**rest_path}") .get(StaticDir::new("uploads").auto_list(true)), ); let acceptor = TcpListener::new("127.0.0.1:5800").bind().await; Server::new(acceptor).serve(router).await; } ``` `Cargo.toml` ```rs [package] name = "poc" version = "0.1.0" edition = "2024" [dependencies] salvo = { version = "0.85.0", features = ["serve-static"] } tokio = { version = "1", features = ["macros", "rt-multi-thread", "fs"] } tracing-subscriber = "0.3" ``` # Impact JavaScript execution, most likely leading to an account takeover, depending on the site's constraint (CSP, etc…).