CVE-2022-46171 — Vulnerability in tauri — CVE Details

### Impact The filesystem glob pattern wildcards `*`, `?`, and `[...]` match file path literals and leading dots by default, which unintentionally exposes sub folder content of allowed paths. Example: The `fs` scope `$HOME/*.key` would also allow `$HOME/.ssh/secret.key` to be read even though it is in a sub directory of `$HOME` and is inside a hidden folder. Scopes without the wildcards are not affected. As `**` allows for sub directories the behavior there is also as expected. ### Patches The issue has been patched in the latest release and was backported into the currently supported 1.x branches. ### Workarounds No workaround is known at the time of publication. ### References The original report contained information that the `dialog.open` component automatically allows one sub directory to be read, regardless of the `recursive` option. Imagine a file system looking like ``` o ../ o documents/ - file.txt - deeper/ o deep_file.txt ``` Reproduction steps: 1. Trying to load “file.txt” or “deep_file.txt” doesn’t work. Expected 2. Select “documents” as folder to open(ie. with window.__TAURI__.dialog.open) 3. Trying to load “file.txt” works. Expected 5. Trying to load “deep_file.txt” also works, which isn’t expected The recursive flag is used in https://github.com/tauri-apps/tauri/blob/cd8c074ae6592303d3f6844a4fb6d262eae913b2/core/tauri/src/scope/fs.rs#L154 to scope the filesystem access to either files in the folder or to also include sub directories. The original issue was replicated and further investigated. The root cause was triaged to the `glob` crate facilitating defaults, which allow the `*` and `[...]` to also match path literals. ```rust MatchOptions { case_sensitive: true, require_literal_separator: false, require_literal_leading_dot: false } ``` This implicated that not only the `dialog.open` component was affected but rather all `fs` scopes containing the `*` or `[...]` glob. During this investigation it became obvious that the current glob matches would also match hidden folder (e.g: `.ssh`) content by default, without explicitly allowing hidden folders to be matched. This is not commonly expected behavior in comparison to for example `bash`. The new default Match options are: ```rust MatchOptions { case_sensitive: true, require_literal_separator: true, require_literal_leading_dot: true } ``` > Another note security relevant for developers building applications interacting with case sensitive filesystems is, that the `case_sensitive` option only affects ASCII file paths and is not valid in Unicode based paths. This is considered a known risk until the `glob` crate supports non-ASCII file paths for this type of case sensitive matching. ### For more Information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in tauri Email us at [security@tauri.app](mailto:security@tauri.app)